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THE FCC'S REGULATORY MULLIGAN: EXPLORING THE
OPTIONS IN THE WAKE OF A FAILED D BLOCK AUCTION

Alejandro Valencia'
In March 2008, the Federal Communications Commission
auctioned licenses to sizeable tracts of radiofrequency spectrum
that will be vacated due to the analog-to-digital television
conversion to occur in June 2009. The Commission conditioned
the license to one portion of this spectrum-the "D Block"-on an
unprecedentedrequirement:for the licensee to work hand-in-hand
with public-safety agencies in a "public/private partnership" to
deploy a nationwide public-safety communications network. At
auction, the D Block garnered only minimal interest from
prospective bidders and missed its reserve price by a wide margin.
This failure drew the ire of policymakers, the telecommunications
industry, and the public-safety community alike. The Commission
subsequently reviewed its options but ultimately decided to reauction the D Block with a modified public/private partnership
requirement designed to entice more bidders. Nevertheless, in
pursuing this goal, the Commission should refuse to lower D Block
network performance requirements and should ensure that the
public-safety community gets the earliestand most complete access
to a deployed D Block network.
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a parcel of government-owned land wanted by a
developer for the purposes of erecting a shopping mall. Then think
of an adjacent parcel of land on which the government plans to
build a hospital. Both of the contiguous parcels are widely
considered prime real estate for their prospective purposes. There
' B.S. Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, 2004.
The author is a utilities engineer and technology expert with PEPCo, a
Washington, D.C.-area diversified electric utility provider. The author would
like to thank Angela Kronenberg for her insight and comments.
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is a considerable amount of foot traffic that would bring business
to the mall. Moreover, the parcels are both easily accessible from
a major highway, which would benefit both the mall and the
hospital.
The government, however, does not have the funding to build
its hospital. Nevertheless, aware of the high priority the developer
puts on the construction of its shopping mall, the government
agrees to sell the parcel to the developer for an adjusted, belowmarket price. This agreement occurs under the conditions that (1)
the developer also construct the hospital for the government, and
(2) the shopping mall allow exclusive usage of its entire parking
lot by the hospital in times when the need for medical attention is
heightened, a situation that would preclude anyone from visiting
the mall.
The developer, with more than enough construction equipment
and personnel to operate that equipment, has ample means to
facilitate the construction of both the shopping mall and the
hospital. Moreover, due to the parcels' proximity, the developer
could allocate its construction resources to both sites almost as if
they were one. Additionally, the money saved by the developer in
paying only a below-market cost for the shopping mall lot is a
worthy concession for the temporary and likely rare annex of its
parking lot.
A similar quid pro quo motivated "the public-private
partnership" condition placed on certain a swath of the radiofrequency spectrum when it was auctioned in March, 2008.
Whereas the hypothetical developer-government partnership
occurs through land in the negotiation of a construction deal, the
public-private partnership required as a condition of the spectrum
auction would occur through analogous "sites" located in the radio
frequency spectrum as described below.
On June 12, 2009, the Federal Communications Commission
will revoke all licenses for the broadcasting of analog signals in the
United States.2 The Digital Television Transition and Public
2 In

re Implementation of the DTV Delay Act, Report and Order and Sua
Sponte Order on Reconsideration, 24 F.C.C.R. 1607
1 (Feb. 13, 2009),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-9Al.pdf
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Safety Act of 2005 ("DTV Act")' mandates the conversion of all
analog television transmissions to digital format.' Not only will
the analog broadcast stoppage leave certain prized' swaths of the

("Congress extended the date for the completion of the nationwide DTV
transition from February 17, 2009 to June 12, 2009. As a result, after June 12,
2009, full-power television broadcast stations must transmit only digital signals,
and may no longer transmit analog signals except for limited analog "nightlight"
service.... Congress extended the transition date in order to permit analog
service to continue until consumers have had additional time to prepare."). See
also Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006); Digital Television
Transition and Public Safety Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006) (setting a firm
deadline of February 18, 2009 for revocation of analog licenses); id. § 337(e)(1)
(2006) ("Any full-power television station licensee that holds a television
broadcast license to operate between 698 and 806 megahertz may not operate at
that frequency after February 17, 2009."); Phil Goldstein, AT&T, Verizon Split
Over DTV Delay, FIERCEWIRELESS, Jan. 13, 2009, http://www.fiercewireless

.com/story/t-verizon-split-over-dtv-delay/2009-01-13
(noting
that AT&T
favored a short delay but Verizon opposed it); Ted Heam, Verizon Flip-Flopson
DTV Delay, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.multichannel

.com/article/162373-VerizonFlip Flops On DTV Delay.php (noting that after
initially opposing the delay, Verizon switched sides after considering the delay's
planned brevity and limited duration).
47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
4 See generally id.
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, 15,564 (July 31, 2007)
(statement of Comm'r Jonathan Adelstein, approving in part, concurring in part)
("These 700 MHz licenses are the finest crown jewels the FCC has to put up for
auction. This coveted spectrum presents us with a historic opportunity to
facilitate vibrant, spectrum-based opportunities for both consumers and wireless
providers."); see Robert X. Cringely, Everything You Always Wanted to Know
About the 700-Iz Auction but Were Afraid to Ask: Expert Op-Ed, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology
/industry/4246037.html ("[T]he 60 MHz of spectrum that's about to be
auctioned is the last prime real estate for mobile communications that will be
available in the U.S. for decades to come."); Lawrence J. Movshin, Major Issues
In Wireless Telecommunications 2006-2007, 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 93, 98 (2007) (recognizing the

700 MHz range of the radio frequency spectrum as the "last great frontier" for
wireless telecommunications services); Posting of Carl Weinschenk to
http://www.itbusinessedge.comlblogs/cip/?p=230 (Nov. 15, 2007, 13:43 EST)
(comparing the value of the spectrum to that of "land in the Grand Canyon or
Central Park in New York City.").
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700-MHz radio frequency spectrum remarkably unencumbered,6 it
also will return that spectral property to the control of the
Commission.
As mandated by the DTV Act, the portions of spectrum to be
vacated and returned to the Commission were to be auctioned off
by March 2008, about a year in advance of the license revocation
deadline.! Among the portions slated for auction was the
legislatively designated "D Block,"' a pair of choice spectral bands
with superior transmission characteristics located in the Upper 700
MHz range.o Unlike the other portions slated for auction,"
however, the Commission would auction the D Block subject to
certain obligations.12 In particular, the Commission would award
the winning bidder at auction with the license to the spectral band
only after the prospective licensee accepted certain terms for the
block's usage as part of a "public/private partnership." 3 This

Second Report and Order,22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 T 4 (showing only 26 MHz of
spectrum in the 698-806 MHz range as occupied, leaving bands in aggregate of
82 MHz for auction).
'47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
8Id. The DTV Act set out the bare-bones requirements and goals of the then
date-yet-to-be-determined auction. Among them were the statutory deadlines
for removal of analog signals from the airwaves, the deadline for the auction,
and the deadline for the Commission's depositing of the funds generated by the
auctions in the U.S. Treasury. Id.
9 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 16,
2008, PublicNotice, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,004 2 (Aug. 17, 2007).
1o Cringely, supra note 5 ("[T]he 60 MHz of spectrum that's about to be
auctioned is the last prime real estate for mobile communications that will be
available in the U.S. for decades to come.").
"Public Notice, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,004 1 2 ("[T]he Commission will make
6

available 176 licenses . . . in the A Block, 734 licenses . . . in the B Block, 176
licenses . . . in the E Block, 12 licenses . . . in the C Block, and one nationwide
license . . . in the D Block.").
12 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 4 (July 31, 2007) (specifically
designating the D Block as "associated with the 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership.").
'3 Id. ("[I]t would serve the public interest to . .. establish[] a nationwide 10megahertz commercial license in the Upper 700 MHz Band D Block that will be
awarded to the winning bidder once it has entered into a Commission-approved
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partnership would require the D Block licensee to build out a
nationwide, broadband communications network on which an
interoperable public safety communications network could also
operate. 4 Such an arrangement would allow for the construction
of a long-desired," nationwide interoperable public safety network
at minimal cost to the government while also retrieving through the
auction the value of the spectral band.'"
Thus, like the hypothetical developer of the shopping mall, the
winning bidder at auction would obtain a license to the D Block for
an adjusted price by agreeing to build the infrastructure of a
nationwide, broadband interoperable public-safety network.
Additionally, the licensee would be required to give priority access
to that public-safety network just as the developer agreed to build
the hospital and to arrange for the priority use of the shopping
mall's parking lot.
The proposed public-private partnership would address the
pressing need" for a more cohesive communication network for
use in emergency situations, such as natural disasters and terrorism
attacks, while also obtaining for the public the fair value for the

Network Sharing Agreement (NSA) with the Public Safety Broadband
Licensee.").
14 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
4 ("This D Block license
will be conditioned upon its commercial licensee constructing and operating a
nationwide, interoperable broadband network across both the D Block and the
700 MHz public safety broadband spectrum.").
' Id. at 15,560 (statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps, approving in part,
concurring in part) ("For far too long, our nation's first responders have
struggled with the lack of interoperability.").
6
Id. 13 ("As the means for enabling the construction of a nationwide,
interoperable broadband public safety network, we provide for the establishment
of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership between the commercial D Block
licensee and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee in the Upper 700 MHz
Band.").
7
Id. at 15,560 (statement of Comm'r Copps); id at 15,557 (statement of
Chairman Kevin J. Martin) ("We are all aware of problems that have been
created by the lack of interoperability for public safety communications during
recent crises like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina . . . . It is imperative that the
Commission . . . provide a communications solution for our Nation's first

responders ....

).
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radio frequency spectrum, a public resource.'" On the other hand,
the commercial licensee would obtain license to a prized 9 piece of
spectrum at a reduced, obligation-acknowledging cost20 while
putting into place the infrastructure required for a nationwide
interoperable public-safety network and its own commercial
network with the same swing of the crane. 2'
And while the Commission did hold the auction in March
2008, the D Block fetched a relatively paltry $472 million, missing
its reserve price of $1.33 billion by a country mile.22 Meanwhile,
the C Block, a characteristically similar lot in the Upper 700 MHz
neighborhood,2 3 went for substantially more than its reserve price.24
The failure of D Block to sell, and the resulting inability to put
into place the pieces required by the public/private partnership, has

47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
Cringely, supra note 5 ("[T]he 60 MHz of spectrum that's about to be
auctioned is the last prime real estate for mobile communications that will be
available in the U.S. for decades to come."); see Movshin, supra note 5, at 98
(recognizing the 700 MHz range of the radio frequency spectrum as the "last
great frontier" for wireless telecommunications services."); Weinschenk, supra
note 5 (comparing the value of the spectrum to "land in the Grand Canyon or
Central Park in New York City.").
20 In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 16, 2008,
Public Notice, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,004 52 (Aug. 17, 2007) ("The Commission
expressly noted that the . .. limitations on the flexibility of the D Block licensee,
should be given weight in assessing the D Block's potential market value. [Prior
auctions] might suggest a D Block reserve price of $1.7 billion. However, in
light of the [conditions on the license], it might be appropriate to expect bidders
to bid only about 75 percent to 80 percent of such an amount, or about $1.33
billion.").
21 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 386 (July 31, 2007) ("This
network must be used to provide both a commercial service and a broadband
network service to public safety entities.").
22 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 2 (Mar. 20, 2008).
23 With respect to signal propagation qualities, C and D Blocks are similar.
See generally Cringely, supra note 5 (describing the ideal signal propagation
characteristics provided by the 700 MHz band as a whole).
24 See Auction Closing Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 4572 1 2 (identifying the winning
C Block bid at $4.7 billion, over $100 million in excess of its reserve).
'"See
19
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been called a "travesty"25 and a "fiasco."26 While the colorful
language might not conjure the image of a red-taped Capitol Hill
radio frequency spectrum auction, the miss soured both
policymakers and the telecommunications world. 27 The D Block
auction, on which many placed high hopes,2 8 failed to draw more
than a faint hint of interest from prospective bidders.29
Consequently, that lack of bidding forced the Commission back to
its drawing board to rethink its options.30

25 In re Auction of the D-Block License in
the 758-763 and 788-793 MHz
Bands, Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 5421, 5423 (Mar. 20, 2008) (statement of Comm'r
Michael J. Copps) ("It is a travesty that our nation has failed, so far, to meet this
urgent public safety challenge.").
26 Jeffrey Silva, Lawmakers Reconsider in Wake of 700 MJHz Auction: Some
Call for D Block Conditions to Be Removed, RCR WIRELESS, Apr.15, 2008,
available at http://www.rcrwireless.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080415/
FREE/129018992/1005.
27 See Auction of the D-Block License, 23 F.C.C.R. at 5424 (statement of
Comm'r Jonathan Adelstein); Silva, supra note 26.
28 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, 15,557 (July 31, 2007)
(statement of Chairman Kevin Martin) ("With this Second Report and Order, the
Commission takes an historic step towards two goals that have been priorities of
mine as Chairman: (1) creating a nationwide, interoperable public safety
broadband network and (2) furthering procompetition broadband policies
designed to increase penetration and ensure that consumers benefit from
innovation and technological advancements."); id. at 15,564 (statement of
Comm'r Adelstein) ("Our decision today is one of the most significant and
groundbreaking we have conducted in the time I have served .... This coveted
spectrum presents us with a historic opportunity to facilitate vibrant, spectrumbased opportunities for both consumers and wireless providers.").
29 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 1 2 (Mar. 20, 2008). The Commission's releasing of auction
results showed bidding results for each of the five spectrum blocks in the March
action, the only one of which not to meet its pre-set reserve was the D Block.
Id.
30 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Delinks 700 MHz Upper
D Block From Other Blocks, Will Release Information on 700 MHz Auction
Winning Bidders (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-280948Al.pdf
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spectrum license

auctions since 1994," the auction of the D Block license was

unprecedented for several reasons. 32 For the first time, the license
in question drags with it conditions far beyond the typical gardenvariety obligations associated with auctioned spectrum licenses,
namely the requirements of the public/private partnership."
Moreover, the unsavory prospect of working intimately with shotcalling public-safety agencies to address undefined guidelines3 4
and meet unrealistic expectations" with respect to the public safety
network scared off bidders in the March auction,3 6 resulting in a
winning bid that was unexpectedly low."
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, About Auctions, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
default.htm?job=about auctions (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) ("The Commission
has found that spectrum auctions more effectively assign licenses than either
comparative hearings or lotteries. The auction approach is intended to award the
licenses to those who will use them most effectively.").
32 See Donny Jackson, PSST D Block Auction Picture Gets Murkier, URGENT
COMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 25, 2008, available at http://urgentcomm.com/mag/
radio blockauction-picture/ (commenting on the unprecedented nature of the
D Block auction in light of the D Block's association with the public/private
partnership).
31

3

id.

In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 (Sept. 25,
2008) (acknowledging the vagaries present in the first auction and stating the
intention to "to clarify and revise the rules to clearly establish the obligations of
the parties to the partnership with greater specificity and detail. These
clarifications and revisions address whether the D Block will be licensed on a
nationwide or regional basis, the obligations of the parties regarding the
construction and operation of the shared wireless broadband network, the rules
governing the process for establishing an NSA between the parties, certain
auction issues, and issues related to public safety users and the Public Safety
Broadband Licensee.").
3 Art Brodsky, Public Safety Doomed "D Block" Auction to Failure,PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE POLICY BLOG, Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.publicknowledge.
org/node/1479 ("The reasons [for the lack of interest in the D Block] are of the
34

public safety community's own making .

. .

. They set conditions before the

auction took place which no commercial company in its right mind would even
think about meeting.").
36 See Brian Dolan, 700 MHz Auction: C Block meets its reserve, open access
sticks, FIERCE WIRELESS, Jan. 31, 2008, available at http://www.fiercewireless
.com/story/700-mhz-auction-c-block-meets-its-reserve-open-access-sticks/2008-
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After having resolved to re-auction the D Block license, the
Commission is currently weighing its options as to how to re-pitch
the D Block.3 1 More than a handful of policymakers see the reauction as an opportunity to craft more effective auction rules for
the second go-around." As discussed later, the most noteworthy of
those possible rule changes include a regional licensing scheme40
and the loosening of build-out requirements and performance
standards for network operation.4'
The Commission's stated goals in the auction of the D Block
are (1) promoting public safety through rapid deployment of the
nationwide interoperable public-safety network,42 (2) obtaining fair
value for the spectrum,4 3 and (3) promoting competition among
wireless communications service providers." In view of these
01-31 (describing the effect of the public-safety obligations attached to the D
Block as making potential bidders not want to "touch the D Block with a ten
foot pole").
37 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 2 (Mar. 20, 2008).
38 See generally In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792
MHz Bands, Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
(Sept. 25, 2008).
39 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 8047 1 2 (May 14,
2008).
40 Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
3
("With regard to the appropriate geographic area, we propose to offer the D
Block both as a single nationwide license and on a regional basis .... ")
(emphasis added).
41 Id.
4-15 (proposing several rules changes which focus on making buildout and network performance requirements more attainable to a wider array of
prospective bidders).
42 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order,22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 322 (July 31, 2007).
43 Id. $ 213-214 (addressing the need to obtain fair market value for the
spectrum and to promote the efficient use of the spectrum).
44 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(C)(i)(II) (2006).
Among the objectives of Section
3096) of the Act are "the development and rapid deployment of new
technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those
residing in rural areas;" and "promoting economic opportunity and competition
and ensuring that the new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to
the American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small
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goals, the Commission can take certain actions that would allow it
to juggle these competing interests so as to maximize the benefit to
the general public good.
The Commission should consider both national and regional
licensing models in proceeding with the D Block, but it should
maintain stringent performance requirements for the operation of
the interoperable public-safety network. The public interests
central to the auction cannot be fully satisfied simultaneously. 45
The desperate need for a public safety communications network to
assist our first responders has been highlighted in recent years by
the uncoordinated and sluggish response efforts after Hurricane
Katrina and 9/11 46 Nevertheless, the Commission has a duty to
ensure that the public receives just compensation for public
resources, which in this case is the increasingly limited47 amount of
radio frequency spectrum.48 In addition, the Commission must
businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by member of
minority groups and women." Id. § 309(j)(3).
45 As evidenced by the March auction, the goal of a high-standard, rapidly
deployed public-safety network and the goal of selling the D Block for fair
value cannot both be achieved. The Commission will need to make concessions
either to the interest of public safety by lowering proposed network operating
standards so as to make the D Block more palatable to prospective bidders, or to
the interest of obtaining fair value for public resources by taking a considerable
amount less than it had hoped in exchange for the spectrum.
46 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, 15,560 (Mar. 20, 2008)
(statement of Comm'r Michael J. Copps) ("For far too long, our nation's first
responders have struggled with the lack of interoperability. The terrible costs of
this failure became tragically apparent in the aftermath of 9/11 and again
following Hurricane Katrina ...

. Our nation's first responders have struggled

for too long without finding the capital necessary to build out a broadband
network with the configuration and the features they so desperately need and
deserve.").
47 Cringely, supra note 5 ("[T]he 60 MHz of spectrum that's about to be
auctioned is the last prime real estate for mobile communications that will be
available in the U.S. for decades to come.").
48 See Commc'ns Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)(3)(C) (1934) (stating the
objectives of competitive bidding auctions to include "recovery for the public of
a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made available for
commercial use and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods
employed to award uses of that resource."). But see In re Auction of 700 MHz
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remember to promote increased competition,49 especially in a
market dominated by a mere handful of powerful network
operators who hold the keys to consumer price regulation.so If the
Commission acknowledges that, in this case, all three interests
cannot be reconciled neatly, it must take steps to elevate the
interest of public safety over others. Consequently, even if the
Commission modifies auction requirements to make the D Block
more attractive to potential bidders, it should not, at any cost,
compromise the standard of operation for the interoperable
broadband public-safety network.
Part II of this article gives the background surrounding the
emergence of the D Block as the carrot the Commission hoped
would entice commercial bidders and ultimately draw one into a
nationwide public/private partnership. Part II first describes the
historical impetus behind joint public/private partnership, and then
outlines the build-up to the auction, including why the auction
rules were set as they were and the various proposals the
Commission explored prior to the auction. In an effort to arrive at
Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 4572 2 (Mar. 20, 2008)
(showing that the aggregate amount of proceeds from all blocks comfortably
exceeded Congressionally budgeted estimates).
49 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. at 15,564 (statement of Comm'r
Adelstein). Specifically, Commissioner Adelstein stated:
Our job at the FCC is to do whatever we can to promote spectrumbased opportunities in the future ....

We want to promote flexibility

and innovation, but since the spectrum is a finite public resource, we
want to see results as well. In our item today, we adopt some of the
strongest performance requirements in history to ensure that this
wireless frontier truly gets developed. As we did with the homesteaders
150 years ago, we are happy to get this prime real estate in the hands of
those that will use it. Just like the government required of
homesteaders, we want this fertile soil tilled and put into use, including
in rural areas of the country. Out of this development will sprout the
fruits of innovative product and service offerings to every corner of
America.
Id.
50 See Center for Democracy & Technology, Airwave Auction a Unique
Opportunity to Promote Broadband, Openness (June 1, 2007), http://www.
cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2007/8 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (positing
that the current state of the telecommunications industry is widely dictated by
just a few companies).
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the solution most beneficial to the public, Part III analyzes the
competing interests and weighs those interests with respect to
different avenues available to the Commission. Finally, Part IV
concludes that the spectral band would best serve the public if the
Commission (1) refuses to lower critical high-performance system
requirements for the interoperable broadband public-safety
network, (2) gives regional licensing priority, and (3) takes
necessary steps to ensure licensing in the upcoming auction.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF, ROAD TO, AND FALLOUT OF THE
AUCTION

Over ten years of statutory promulgation and regulatory
posturing culminated in the March 2008 auction of the soon-to-bevacant 700 MHz spectrum." In reality, though, the story began in
the mid 1990s with the Commission's forethought into the states of
television and the radio frequency spectrum early in the next
century.52
A. The Emergence of the D Block as Newly Available Spectrum
Since the emergence of the television as a household appliance,
bulky analog transmission signals have occupied much of the
highly-prized 700 MHz-range telecommunications spectrum."
The analog-to-digital conversion mandated by the Digital
Television Transition Act of 2005, however, will leave a

51See Telecommc's Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(encouraging the deployment of broadband services to all Americans); Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. LA. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (setting a 2006,
end-of-year deadline for the completion of eighty-five percent of the DTV
conversion, but allowing for exceptions in several situations).
52 See Telecommc'ns Act of 1996, supra note 51; see also Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, supra note 51.
See generally Center for Democracy &
Technology, supra note 50.
53 See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, The Digital TV Transition: What You Need
to Know About DTV, http://www.dtv.gov/consumercomer.html#faq2 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009) (characterizing analog television signals as less efficient
and of lower quality than those of digital).

SPRING 2009]

The FCC's Regulatory Mulligan

325

considerable amount of that spectrum vacant.54
The next
subsection reviews the relevant legislation and discusses the
implications of the analog-to-digital conversion and the resulting
control the Commission will have over the newly available
spectrum.
1. The DigitalTelevision Transition and PublicSafety Act of
2005
Having anticipated the widespread migration from analog to
digital for over a decade, Congress sought to lay out early
guidelines for the massive conversion with sections of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Balanced Budget Act of
1997." Those statutes, along with a catalog of other legislation,
converged in 2005 with President Bush's signing of the DTV

Act.5 6
The combination of the DTV Act and the more recent DTV
Delay Act mandated the end of all analog television transmissions
by June 2009." Under authority of supporting legislation requiring
a competitive auction of the vacated radio frequency spectrum,"
the Commission ordered that nearly 100 MHz of spectrum was to
be auctioned to commercial bidders." Presumably, those bidders
would come
in two
forms:
(1) already-established
telecommunications industry powers and (2) technology-based
software applications companies looking to find a foothold in the
telecommunications industry. However, the Commission would

54 See Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 1 4 (showing bands
constituting only 26 MHz total as occupied in the 698-806 MHz range, leaving
bands in aggregate of 82 MHz for auction).
5 See Telecommc'ns Act of 1996, supra note 51; see also Balanced Budget
See generally Center for Democracy &
Act of 1997, supra note 51.
Technology, supra note 50.
56 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
57
d.
58 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006); Digital Television
Transition and Public Safety Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006) (setting out auction
guidelines); see Balanced Budget Act of 1997, supra note 51.
5 Second Report and Order,22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 T 4.
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reserve certain sections of the 700 MHz spectrum for use by a
nationwide interoperable public safety network.o
The need for an interoperable broadband network designated
for public safety was highlighted first by the lag in response time
after 9/11 and subsequently by the sluggish mobilization of first
responders during Hurricane Katrina.' Mid-1990's legislation had
set into motion the public safety spectrum movement by allocating
a certain portion of the spectrum to future public safety use
through more primitive technologies. The magnitude of the two
recent crises, however, led officials to call for the use of newer
broadband technologies-only then being perfected-in the
implementation of an interoperable public safety network. The
return of several bands of spectrum previously occupied by analog
signals to the Commission would serve as the impetus to assign
dedicated public safety spectrum and to explore how to use it most
efficiently and effectively.62
2.

The Idea Behind the Public/PrivatePartnership
To affect a nationwide deployment of the interoperable
broadband public safety network, the Commission would auction
both the commercial D Block license and the public safety license,
the latter to be held by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
("PSBL")." The D Block licensee would enter into a network
sharing agreement jointly with the PSBL.'
U.S.C. § 337(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]he Commission shall allocate ... 24
megahertz of that spectrum for public safety services . . . .").
61 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. at 15,560 (statement
of Comm'r
Copps) (stating the need not only for an interoperable public-safety network, but
also a need for that network to employ the best available technologies, namely
broadband).
62 47 U.S.C. § 337(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]he Commission shall allocate ... 24
megahertz of that spectrum for public safety services . . . .").
63 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 1 395 ("[E]ffectuat[ing] a
public/private partnership between the Commission-selected Public Safety
Broadband Licensee and the winning bidder of the Upper 700 MHz Band D
Block license would serve the public interest.").
64 See id. The PSBL is a group of fifteen public-safety groups entrusted with
control over the public-safety bands. Public Safety Spectrum Trust-About the
PSST, http://www.psst.org/memberorgs.jsp (last visited March 6, 2009).
Member organizations of the PSBL include the American Association of State
60 47
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While the PSBL would advance a unified national approach to
the use of the public safety spectrum, finally enabling
communication among public safety users during times of crisis,
the commercial D Block licensee would construct a nationwide
broadband network to serve both its portion of the spectrum and
the public safety spectrum." By requiring this build-out as a
condition on the commercial D Block license, the Commission
would use the D Block as a vehicle to ensure the construction of
the public-safety network at minimal cost to the government.66
B. The Significance of the D Block to the Commission and the
TelecommunicationsIndustry
At the time of the DTV Act's enactment, the 700 MHz band
already had been subdivided into several spectrum parcels.6' A
number of those parcels had previously been licensed to
commercial entities broadcasting digital signals, others had been
set aside for use by public safety organizations, and the remainder
was occupied by analog broadcast signals, namely TV Channels
Highway and Transportation Officials, the American Hospital Association, the
Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials-International, the
Forestry Conservation Communications Association, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the Intemational Association of Fire Chiefs, the
International City/County Management Association, the International Municipal
Signal Association, the National Association of State Emergency Medical
Services Officials, the National Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators, the
National Emergency Management Association, the National Emergency
Number Association, the National Fraternal Order of Police, the National
Governors Association, and the National Sheriffs' Association. Id.
65 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
395; id. at 15,557
(statement of Chairman Martin) ("We cannot keep licensing public safety
spectrum in the same manner as before and expect a different result. A National
Public Safety Broadband Licensee will facilitate a unified national approach to
the use of this spectrum, finally enabling all public safety users to talk to each
other during a crisis.").
66
Id.
13 ("As the means for enabling the construction of a nationwide,
interoperable broadband public safety network, we provide for the establishment
of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership between the commercial D Block
licensee and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee in the Upper 700 MHz
Band.").
67
id.
4-6.
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52-69.6" Instead of a simpler conceptualization as a monolithic
block of spectrum, the 700-MHz range is more accurately
described as a contiguous collection of smaller bands, the majority
of which were still available at the time of the DTV Act. 69
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Figure 1. The 700-MHz spectrum, the D Block, and the Public Safety
spectrum. 70 Bottom row shows TV channels by number, while top shows
corresponding names of spectrum blocks reassigned.

The D Block consists of two distinct frequency bands in the
Upper 700-MHz spectrum.7' Each of these bands shares an upper
limit with the lower limit of a Public Safety band.72 The proximity
of the D Block to the Public Safety spectrum means the build-out
of a nationwide network of transmission stations-covering both
the D Block and the Public Safety spectrum-is both physically
and economically efficient."
In other words, the spectral
proximity of the D Block to the Public Safety spectrum would
allow for a network build-out through the construction of stations
capable of transmitting and receiving signals in D block and Public
68

Id.

69

Id.

1.

1 4-6.

Matthew Lasar, First Responders to Commission: Give Up National D
Block Pipe Dream, ARS TECHNICA, July 31, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/
old/content/2008/07/first-responders-to-fcc-give-up-national-d-block-pipedream.ars (citing generally Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289).
71 Second Report and Order,22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
4.
70

72

Id.

Id. 396 ("[The public/private partnership] will provide the D Block
licensee with rights to operate commercial services in the 10 megahertz of
public safety broadband spectrum on a secondary, preemptible basis, which will
both help to defray the costs of build-out and ensure that the spectrum is used
efficiently."). See Cringely, supra note 5.
7
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Safety frequencies.74 This doubling-up of facilities would both
financially benefit the ultimate commercial D Block licensee" and
increase the rapidity of the licensee's nationwide deployment,76
both of which were goals of the Commission.
The spectral blocks in the 700-MHz range are highly coveted
by telecommunications service providers companies due to their
highly favorable signal propagation characteristics." That range
includes the D Block and the Public Safety spectrum, among
others, and comprises the last piece of fertile mobile
communications spectrum to be available for decades to come."
With respect to mobile communications, lower frequencies
provide a more efficient transmission medium than higher
frequencies.so Signals transmitted at lower frequencies propagate
Id. 4. See also Timothy Lance & Heidi Wachs, Spectrum Reallocationfor
Public Safety Broadband: The 700 MI-z Auction, EDUCAUSE REVIEW, Nov./Dec.
2007, at 146, available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/ pdf/ERM07613.pdf
("[A] public/private partnership with a combined infrastructure built out and
usable for commercial purposes but with emergency and public-safety usage
always preempting in the designated frequencies could yield a more rapidly
deployed, robust infrastructure.").
7 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
396 ("Providing for a
shared infrastructure that uses the D Block and the public safety broadband
spectrum will help achieve significant cost efficiencies." (citing APCO 700
MHz Further Notice Comments at 11; Northrop Grumman 700 MHz Further
Notice Comments at 5; Sprint Nextel 700 MHz FurtherNotice Comments at 78)).
76
Id. 4.
n7 Id. 396. In hoping for the most rapid deployment possible with respect to
the interoperable nationwide public-safety network, the Commission saw the
financial burden on the commercial licensee as a major obstacle to the build-out
and thus hoped to alleviate that burden as much as possible. Id.
78 See Cringely, supra note 5; accord Movshin, supra note 5, at 98
(recognizing the 700 MHz range of the radio frequency spectrum as the "last
great frontier" for wireless telecommunications services.").
See also
Weinschenk, supra note 5 (comparing the value of the spectrum to that of "land
in the Grand Canyon or Central Park in New York City.").
79 See Cringely, supra note 5; Weinschenk, supra note 5 (describing the
magnitude of the auction as comparable to if "the powers-that-be decided to
auction off the land in the Grand Canyon or Central Park.").
80 See Cringely, supra note 5 (commenting on the ideal characteristics of the
700 MHz spectrum for voice signal transmissions). Accord Cheryl A. Tritt,
74
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farther and more easily penetrate building walls, such that they do
not require a clear "line of sight" between any given transmitter
and corresponding receiver."
These ideal propagation
characteristics make the Upper 700-MHz spectrum a far superior
medium for mobile communications transmissions than the 1900MHz bands used by cellular network operators.82
In fact, the penetration characteristics in the 700-MHz range
would enable wireless services that have higher data rates than
those currently provided by cable modems and are two orders of
magnitude cheaper than broadband connectivity via fiber."
Moreover, the 700-MHz band would serve as a useful tool to
extend network access to rural pockets currently out of the reach of
broadband signals and to parts of cities still relying on dial-up

access. 84
A network of transmission stations covering the Upper 700MHz Band also would be economical to deploy. Given the band's
ideal propagation characteristics, each transmission station in that
band could service a larger area than an equivalent transmission
station operating on higher frequencies, such that a fully functional
network would require fewer interlocking service areas or "cells."
Thus, in theory, the spectrum's properties would allow
transmission facilities to be spaced further apart, reducing the total

133, 142 (2007) ("The radio
signals in the 700 MHz band can penetrate walls easily and can carry significant
amounts of information at low power, making the 700 MHz band particularly
attractive for wireless broadband services.").
81 See Cringely, supra note 5; Lance & Wachs, supra note 74, at 147
("Although higher-frequency ranges have somewhat greater data-carriage
capacity, the 700 MHz range has extremely desirable propagation
characteristics, with high permeability and low absorption. Whether used for
wireless broadband, emergency service, or other wireless applications, such
permeability/absorption properties significantly reduce the cost of network
deployment."). See generally Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note
50.
82 See Cringely,supra
note 5.
83 See Lance & Wachs, supra note 74, at 147 (expounding
on the possible
benefits
attained
from
a
new
network
operating
in
the
700
MHz
range).
84
d
85 See Cringely,supra note 5.
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number of such facilities needed to be built." This would result in
a total cost savings in the build-out of a nationwide wireless
network estimated to be as much as $5 billion."
The
historically
recent
explosion
in
consumer
telecommunications devices and network expansion by providers
has spurred a land rush to this "last great frontier"" for wireless
telecommunications services.8
Given the spectrum's ideal
propagation characteristics and their direct effect on the cost for a
nationwide network build-out, it is no wonder parties ranging from
the
government
to
both
entrenched
and
aspiring
telecommunications service providers have closely watched the
fate of the 700-MHz spectrum."o
C. The Road to the Auction
The March 2008 auction represented an excellent opportunity
to reshape the telecommunications landscape in favor of
consumers.9' However, entrenched telephone and cable companies
worried that such a change would destroy the comfortable status
quo of the existing communications oligopoly.92 For years, these
86 Id.
87 Id.

Movshin, supra note 5, at 98 (recognizing the Upper 700 MHz spectrum
as
the "last great frontier" for wireless telecommunications services).
89 Kate Gerwig, Telecom Market Headingfor Healthy Growth, TIA
Projects,
TELECOM NEWS, Feb. 26, 2008, http://searchtelecom.techtarget.com/news/
article/0,289142,sidl03_gcil302583,00.html ("In the U.S., the telecom market
is expected to see 7.2% in compound annual growth rate ... through 2011.").
90 Public Knowledge,
700 MHz Spectrum Auction, http://www.
publicknowledge.org/issues/spectrum-reform (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)
(listing Verizon, AT&T, Google, the FCC and the Public Interest Spectrum
Coalition as entities with stakes in the 700-MHz spectrum and, more
specifically, in the D Block).
91 See id. (anticipating that the licensing of the D Block to a new market
entrant would create a third broadband service available to the public). See
Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 50 (noting the potential to tilt
internet usage rules now controlled by wealthy service providers back in favor
of the average consumer).
92 See Public Knowledge, supra note 90 (articulating the resistance of legacy
providers to any sort of change, much less the kind that might cause even the
most minor shift of power to another service provider).
88
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incumbents had comfortably dominated the telecommunications
arena. Their fear was that the upcoming auction could bind them
to rules more favorable to consumers, and perhaps even to
facilitate the entry of a new competitor."
In order to make sure that consumers benefited regardless of
which entities won control of the 700 MHz spectrum, the
Commission needed to ensure that auction and service rules bound
all parties to provide the best opportunity for new broadband
With the auction set for early 2008," the
competition.9 4
Commission felt significant pressure to finalize the parameters of

93 Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 50 ("[T]he auction
provides a critical opportunity to foster additional competitive choices in the
broadband Internet market. Today, the vast majority of Americans have at most
two real options for broadband - DSL from their local telephone provider or
cable broadband from their local cable television provider. Wireless could offer
a cost-effective way to help spur greater broadband competition, because it does
not require the expense of laying new wires to individual homes. But wireless
broadband requires spectrum, and most of the potentially suitable spectrum is
already licensed for television and radio broadcasting, mobile phone networks,
and other uses. The 700 MHz spectrum, which has been carrying analog
television broadcasts but is due to be vacated by the broadcasters, represents a
rare set of available, high quality, contiguous radio frequencies. New broadband
competition could benefit consumers in a variety of ways, as broadband
provides a flexible platform that can carry all kinds of services, from voice to
video to data. It also could help reduce any risks to the Internet's essential
characteristics of openness and low entry barriers for innovators. As [Center for
Democracy and Technology] has pointed out in the 'Internet neutrality' debate,
recent changes to the legal regime raise the possibility that network operators
could seek to exercise more "gatekeeper" control over what online services or
applications their customers use. Creation of a viable wireless broadband option
could help provide a competitive check against any move in that direction.").
94 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, 15,557 (July 31, 2007)
(statement of Chairman Kevin Martin) ("[W]e are one step closer to allowing all
Americans to enjoy the benefits of broadband competition-availability, high
speeds, and low prices.").
9 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C § 1305 (2006); Digital Television
Transition and Public Safety Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (2005) (setting out auction
guidelines).
9 In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 16, 2008,
PublicNotice, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,004 12 (Aug. 17, 2007).
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the auction well in advance so as to allow for all interested parties
to develop business plans.96
1. The Establishment ofAuction Rules
In July 2007, the Commission laid out the rules of the
auction."
First, all bidding would be anonymous.9 8
The
Commission identified communication and collusion between
bidders as major flaws in prior auctions.9 9 By such behavior, the
Commission reasoned, the larger companies could effectively
locked out potential new market entrants while keeping prices low
by agreeing upon post-auction division of licenses.'o Therefore,
the Commission found that anonymous bidding would reduce the
potential for anticompetitive bidding, thus serving the public's
interest of retrieving the value of the spectrum. '
Second, the Commission would set reserve prices.10 2
Consistent with the statutory goal of obtaining for the public a fair
Movshin, supranote 5, at 98 ("[T]here was a significant amount of pressure
placed on the Commission to finalize its rules sufficiently before the January 28,
2008 date to assure that parties had adequate time in advance of any application
deadline to develop their business plans and strategies for the auction.").
97 See Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
274-321.
98 Id. 280 ("Based on the current record, we conclude that the public interest
will be served if the upcoming auction of 700 MHz Band licenses for which we
establish service rules today is conducted using anonymous bidding
procedures.").
"9Id. T 282 ("Although some potential bidders may find information regarding
bidding by other parties useful, on balance this benefit likely is substantially
outweighed by the enhanced competitiveness and economic efficiency of the
auction that will result from withholding public release of certain information
96

about bids and bidder identities . ... ).

274-284 ("[E]conomists have observed, as a potential drawback
00 See id.
to disclosing information, that bidders could use the information revealed over
the multiple rounds to signal each other and implement a division of the licenses
at lower than market prices, and in some cases, to retaliate against competing
bidders.").
10' Id. T 280 ("Based on the current record, we conclude that the public
interest will be served if the upcoming auction of 700 MHz Band licenses for
which we establish service rules today is conducted using anonymous bidding
procedures.").
102 Id. T 298 ("We conclude that we should provide for separate aggregate
reserve prices for each block of licenses to promote our statutory objective of
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value for the frequency spectrum, which is considered a public
resource, 10 the Commission would employ reserve prices so as to
leave itself an "out" should it determine that a winning bid less
than the reserve would not serve the public interest.' 0 4
Finally, in conjunction with an unmet reserve price, the
Commission could opt to implement a new auction subject to the
The Commission correctly
same or reconsidered rules.o'
recognized that assigning the D Block license as promptly as
possible would further the significant public interest of rapid
deployment of new services and timely recovery of the public
value of the spectrum. Consequently, the Commission reserved
the right to re-auction the spectrum after modification to the
auction rules in an attempt to meet the original or a new, lowered
reserve. 106

2.

The Specificationsfor the Public/PrivatePartnership
In addition to establishing the rules for the auction, the
Commission set out the proposed plan for the public/private
partnership and the responsibilities to be imposed on the
recovering for the public a portion of the value of the public spectrum
resource.").
103 See Commc'ns Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C)
(1934) (stating the
objectives of competitive bidding auctions to include "recovery for the public of
a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made available for
commercial use and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods
employed to award uses of that resource."). But see In re Auction of 700 MHz
Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 4572 2 (Mar. 20, 2008)
(showing that the aggregate amount of proceeds from all blocks comfortably
exceeds the total of reserve prices).
10In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 T 298 (July 31, 2007). Per the
Balanced Budget Act, the Commission was delegated the responsibility to
determine the most effective methods by which to establish reasonable reserve
prices or minimum opening bids. "[R]eserve prices for each block of licenses
[will] promote our statutory objective of recovering for the public a portion of
the value of the public spectrum resource." Id.
'os Id. 299 ("Our rules also provide for the possibility of re-offering the D
Block license in a subsequent auction. This will maximize the likelihood that
we can recover an appropriate portion of the value of the public spectrum
resource . . .").
106

See id. TI 297-317.
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commercial entity that won the right to participate."o' It based the
plan primarily on two Commission documents from previous
years.'" In 2000, the Commission had established preliminary
guidelines for a plan that would govern spectrum allocations made
in the planned future auction "Band Plan." 09 In 2006, the
Commission revisited the Band Plan when it solicited comments
on the six-year-old blueprint."0 In response, private entities
submitted two notable proposals for implementing the publicprivate partnership that were in tension with the Commission's
Band Plan."'
The first proposal was from Cyren Call Communications
Corporation ("Cyren Call"), a group headed by Morgan O'Brien,
an original principal in Nextel."'2 The group's proposal advanced
the creation of a Public Safety Spectrum Trust (PSST), which
See id.
See id.

386-553.
2 (setting out the bases for the Second Report and Order as
including, inter alia, the August, 2006 Commercial Services proceeding and the
2000 Public Safety "Band Plan" proceeding).
109 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts Rules for
Licensing and Operations in Portion of 700 MHz Band Reallocated from
Television Channels 60 Through 69 (Jan. 6, 2000), http://www.fcc
.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News Releases/2000/nrwlOOO1.html.
" 0 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced
911 Emergency Calling Systems, Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules
Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Second
FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 48506-01 (proposed Aug.
21, 2006).
"' In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R.
8064 30 (April 25, 2007) ("In recent weeks, Frontline has submitted several
filings with the Commission regarding its proposed 'Public Safety Broadband
Deployment Plan' for a portion of the spectrum in the 700 MHz Band."). See
Movshin, supra note 5, at 99 ("Both proposals hoped to leverage the
attractiveness of assuring funding for the build-out and operation of a publicsafety oriented advanced broadband network from a commercial licensee to
obtain easier (and presumably less expensive, if not free) access to the spectrum
so designated.").
112 See In re Reallocation of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777792) From Commercial Use, Petitionfor Rule Making of Cyren Call Commc'ns
Corp., RM- 11348 (filed Apr. 27, 2006).
107
108
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would oversee and control the usage of the entire 30 MHz of
public/private partnership spectrum." 3 Thus, contrary to the Band
Plan's proposal to create a partnership involving a single private,
commercial entity, Cyren Call's plan would allow the PSST to
allocate spectrum access to as many private entities as necessary to
ensure the timely build-out of the broadband network." 4 In return
for the network build-out obligation, the private entities would
have access to the excess capacity on PSST-controlled spectrum.
Moreover, the relatively high public-safety performance standards
discussed in the Band Plan would remain applicable."'
Cyren Call's proposed plan had two main strengths: it avoided
leaving the spectrum to the chance of a blind auction, and it
provided both the PSST and commercial entities ample time to
make informed decisions about the spectrum."' As such, this plan
would have allowed for the controlled, educated assessment of
demand for the commercial bands by the PSST and valuation of
the commercial bands by interested commercial entities.
Furthermore, it also would have allowed for more creative and
potentially more accommodating spectrum licensing terms for the
commercial entities.
On the other hand, the plan required
additional legislation since it would necessitate the reallocation of
certain portions of the spectrum. Another challenge facing this
plan was the need for the PSST to coordinate a nationwide buildout among several different commercial entities-a task some
commentators believed to be undoable." 7
"13 Id. Cyren Call urged the Commission to adopt a public-safety model
whereby the PSST would negotiate terms for long-term access to the spectrum
with private sector entities that would agree to build and maintain a nationwide,
next-generation network for public safety. In exchange, the private sector
entities would gain the right to share the network and sell excess capacity for
commercial purposes. Id.

114 id.
"

Id.

Movshin, supra note 5, at 100.
Donny Jackson, PSST Considers Regional Approach to D Block, Alters
Agreement with Cyren Call, URGENT COMMUNICATIONS, Aug. 25, 2008,
http://urgentcomm.com/policy and_law/news/psst-regional-d-block-0825/index
.html ("[T]here have been concerns that [a regional] model could result in
technological incompatibility and make negotiations with the PSST so complex
116

"
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Meanwhile, Frontline Wireless, LLC ("Frontline"), whose
principals included ex-Commission Chairman Reed Hundt,"'
proposed a different plan to meet the stringent build-out
requirements for the nationwide public-safety network." 9
Frontline advocated the creation of a nationwide commercial
license for 10 MHz of D Block spectrum adjacent to a 10-MHz
public safety band.'20 As a condition of the D Block license, the
commercial licensee would subject itself to governance by the
rules of the public-private partnership. 2 ' In addition to other
obligations, under Frontline's plan the commercial licensee would
be required to facilitate the physical build-out of the network, to
grant priority access to the public-safety broadband network, and
to assure an open-access platform for all commercial users.'22
3. FinalIndustry Pushesfor Network Usage Rules
In April 2007, after hearing the 2006 proposals from Cyren
Call and Frontline, and after setting out the concept of a single,
nationwide public-safety licensee,123 the Commission again sought

that it might be difficult to realize the desired nationwide broadband service for
public safety.").
"18Movshin, supra note 5, at 100.

19In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Report and Order and Further Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R.
8064 269 (April 25, 2007) ("[Frontline's filings] propose various conditions on
10 megahertz of the commercial 700 MHz spectrum that we are required to
auction, also are related to issues in the 700 MHz Guard Bands proceeding and
the 700 MHz Public Safety proceeding.").
20
'
Id. 272 ("Frontline proposes that the Commission alter the upper portion
of the band plan and service rules in the 700 MHz Commercial Services Notice
in order to auction a single nationwide 10-megahertz license .

.

. near the 700

MHz Public Safety spectrum that would be subject to specific conditions.").
121 Id. ("The [license] would consist of the paired 757-762 MHz and 787-792
MHz frequencies . .. [and the] licensee would construct and operate a common
infrastructure to support a broadband public safety network as well as its own
commercial broadband network.").
122

id

See In re Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public
Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, Ninth Notice of ProposedRulemaking,
21 F.C.C.R. 14837 %3-4 (Dec. 20, 2006).
123

338

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 10: 313

comments.'2 4 The solicitation elicited lobbying from a host of
entities in the telecom industry, including some previously silent

commercial interests.12 5
Among the new contestants was Google Inc., which filed an ex
parte comment committing a conditional bid of $4.6 billion in the
upcoming auction. 2 6 In particular, Google conditioned its
proposed bid on the Commission's imposition of several
conditions on the spectrum block, including an "open" platform
network requirement as well as several other stipulations favoring
non-legacy providers.127 Google's proposal found support in
comments filed by the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, which
advocated bringing in new market entrants "interested in
See Sheppard Mullin, Washinton Update March/April 2007, May 4, 2007,
http://www.fcclawblog.com/2007/05/articles/updates/
FCCLAWBLOG,
Mar.
6,
2009)
(last
visited
washington-update-marchapril-2007/
("Disagreements within the Commissioners delayed the meeting for over 8
hours, and even with this added time they were not able to agree upon a specific
band plan. Instead, the FCC adopted a FNPRM that seeks comment on several
different ideas."); see also Movshin, supra note 5, at 102 ("[T]he Cyren Call
proposal generally ran out of steam during the ongoing debate over the
commercial bands.").
125 Movshin, supra note
5, at 99.
126 Letter from Eric Schmidt, Chief Executive Officer,
Google, to Kevin J.
Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (July 20, 2007), available at
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20070720_wireless.html
("[T]he
Commission's draft order includes a reserve price of $4.6 billion for the 'C'
Block, apparently to address unsupported claims about any impact from
124

adopting open platform conditions.

We hereby inform you that .. . Google

intends to commit a minimum of $4.6 billion to bidding in the upcoming
auction.").
127 See Letter from Richard S. Whitt, Washington Telecom and Media
Counsel, Google, to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Secretary, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n (July 9, 2007), at 4, available at http://209.85.203.104/
externalcontent/services.google.comlblog_resources/expart via efiling.pdf
("[C]ompetition can be enabled through . . . tailored requirements that a
meaningful amount of available commercial spectrum be licensed for "open"
broadband platforms. In an environment that fosters open platforms, new
facilities-based entrants will be enticed to bid, and do so successfully.");
Comments of the Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition,WT Dkts. 06-150,
05-211, 96-86 and PS Dkt. 06-229 (May 23, 2007), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdflpisc-fcc-comments-20070523.pdf
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challenging the current cozy wireless oligopoly and broadband

duopoly."I 28
In a nod to Frontline's position on the public/private
partnership1 29 and furthering its own with respect to network rules,
Google, with support from Frontline and software company
Skype,131 championed an "open access" license requirement as a
means to promote new market competition, flexible market
arrangements, and innovation."' Relying on the Commission's
landmark 1968 decision in In re of use of the CarterfoneDevice in
Message Telephone Service,'32 Google advocated that the open
access requirement should extend to all networks-wired or
wireless-as a matter of policy.'
This open access requirement
128 The Public Interest Spectrum Coalition is a consumer-rights-based publicinterest group comprised of Public Knowledge, the Consumer Federation of
America, the Champaign-Urbana Community Wireless Network, Consumers
Union Educause, the Free Press, the Media Access Project, the New America
Foundation, the National Hispanic Media Coalition, and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group. http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pisc-700mhz-lpager.pdf
(last visited Apr. 28, 2009).
129 Whitt, supra note 127, at 3 ("Frontline's proposed wholesale/open access
license requirement, applied to some portion of the available commercial
spectrum, would ensure that at least some service providers would operate in an
open manner.").
13 0 Id. at 6 ("As Skype has made clear, there is a growing list of discriminatory
and anticompetitive practices occurring in the wireless world, whereby users are
denied the opportunity to use desired applications.").
131 Id. at 4 ("New entrants have no legacy business models to promote or
protect, and typically are more willing to embrace wholesale arrangements and
partnerships. Access to open platforms also allows multi-layer activities from
myriad entities, such as software applications providers, content providers,
device makers, Web-based entities, simple resellers, and mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs)."); Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 50
("In comments recently filed with the FCC, [the Center for Democracy &
Technology] urged regulators to capitalize on the opportunity presented by the
auction to promote neutral broadband Internet choices. CDT recommended that
... some portion of [the spectrum] be reserved for wholesale use in order to
create greater competition and choice.").
132 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968) (requiring standard wireline telephone networks to
be open to all devices),
133 Whitt, supra note 127, at 6 (referring to In re of use of the Carterfone
Device in Message Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (June 26, 1968) ("[T]he
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meant that the licensee must (1) permit all applications and devices
to operate on the network (as opposed to "blocking" of
applications or "locking" out of devices from the platform, as
would be permitted to service providers not bound by open access
rules) and (2) the make available network access to third parties at

wholesale rates.134
Open access, Google contended, was absolutely necessary to
give "a Web-based software applications company [like itself] ...
with little pertinent experience in the wireless market" a fighting
chance to procure the nationwide license.'
More importantly,
however, it would be the only possibility to prevent incumbents
Verizon and AT&T from snatching up the license, a result that
would undoubtedly thwart competition.'36 Due to the built-in
advantages afforded to the incumbents by the existing climate in
the telecom arena, adopting rules that favor fledgling telecom
entrants would be the only way to "level the proverbial playing
field.""'

bedrock Carterfone principles underpin this mandate, with support from the
FCC's broadband connectivity principles.").
134See id. at 5-8 (listing the basic requirements of open access); Public
Knowledge, 700 AHz Spectrum Auction, supra note 90 ("[The open access
model] has a proven track record - it led to an explosion of competitive Internet
Service Providers in the 1990's. It is also the model adopted by countries that
are far ahead of the United States in terms of broadband speeds, prices and
services.").
1s
Whitt, supranote 127, at 4.
136 Id. at 5 ("As rational economic actors, those incumbents will then proceed
in a manner that precludes alternative business models and arrangements.").
"3 Id. at 4 ("While some argue that Google could simply choose to outbid any
single entity in the auction, the notion of 'deep pockets' alone is not the correct
measure in this particular instance. Instead, the decisive factors include other
significant economic and operational barriers to entry, and the relative value and
usefulness of spectrum to the bidders. In particular, Verizon and AT&T are
well-established, vertically-integrated incumbent providers of wireless and
wireline services . . . [that] have an embedded national network of towers,

backhaul, customers, retail outlets, and advertising. The incumbents also have
far more ready cash flow at hand, and the willingness to spend it in furtherance

of existing business plans.

Consequently, the spectrum simply has more

economic value and overall usefulness to incumbents like Verizon or AT&T,
than to a would-be new entrant like Google.").
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On the other hand, AT&T filed its own ex parte plea urging
against Google's suggestions,' 8 which it claimed would encumber
licenses and impede broadband deployment.'" After all, AT&T
argued, rapid broadband deployment was at the heart of the
underlying statutory framework that set the auction into motion.140
Furthermore, AT&T claimed that incumbents such as itself valued
the spectrum more and were better equipped to make immediate
use of it than would-be telecom market entrants without the means
to facilitate rapid deployment. Consequently, AT&T asserted that
adopting rules that cater to the wishes of smaller companies and
create the illusion of competition and innovation would in fact
stifle competition and foreclose any possibility of rapid network
deployment.141
AT&T also attacked Google's open-access requests, claiming
that to adopt such rules would contradict the Commission's wellestablished history of wireless deregulation.'42 Based on various
'3 Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice President Fed. Regulatory,
AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
(July 12, 2007), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/att-fcc-letter20070712.pdf.
139 Id. at 2 ("Even putting aside the misconceived nature of Google's specific

proposals .

.

. Google's approach is fatally at odds with the basic purpose of

auctioning spectrum. The Commission's charge here is to identify-and to
award spectrum to-precisely those companies that Google seeks to exclude
from the auction: the companies that value the spectrum most and that will put it
to its most efficient use.").
40
1 Id. at 2-3 ("Google's bid-rigging approach is particularly misguided,
moreover, because it would impede broadband deployment. The Commission is
under a statutory mandate in this proceeding to encourage broadband
deployment, and each of the Commissioners has expressly emphasized that goal
as a primary aim here. There can be no serious dispute that existing wireless
providers, having already invested billions in deploying 3G wireless broadband
networks, are best situated to utilize the 700 MHz band to further that
deployment.").
141 Id. at 6 ("Google's request for 'open access' conditions in the 700 MHz
band is nothing less than a request for the Commission to repudiate this history
of competition, consumer welfare, and ongoing investment, and to adopt instead
highly regulatory, deeply intrusive requirements that would frustrate innovation
and inhibit broadband deployment.").
142 Id. at 4 ("Google's proposal also fails because it runs counter to the
Commission's and Congress's [sic] deregulatory framework for wireless-an
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supporting statistics, AT&T asserted that exclusive-use,
geographically-defined licenses had, in fact, catalyzed and
perpetuated the thriving growth experienced by the wireless
industry since the 1990s.' 43 Thus, according to AT&T, adopting
Google's proposed rules would constitute a "stunning about-face"
in view of the established history of competition and deregulation

in the wireless industry.144
4. The Commission Optsfor "Open-Access Lite"

Amidst the squabbling between AT&T and Google, the
Commission circulated a final plan it endorsed as "open-access."145
Although the Commission touted the plan as bona fide, genuinearticle "open-access,"' 4 6 critics were not convinced.'4 7 Calling the
approach that has been overwhelmingly validated in the marketplace and which
continues to lead to unprecedented consumer welfare.").
143 Id. at 6 ("Most importantly for present purposes, the Commission
has long
embraced a policy of flexible, exclusive-use, geographically defined licenses
that-rather than dictate a business plan based on one particular company's
untried vision of the marketplace-allow carriers to choose the business model
that will enable them to compete in this highly competitive market.").
144 Id. ("[C]onsumer welfare . . . [is] a direct result of the bipartisan consensus
in both the Commission and Congress that consumers are best served by marketbased spectrum policies and an overall deregulatory environment for wireless.").
145 Leslie Cauley, New Rules Could Rock the Wireless World, USA TODAY,
July 10, 2008, at lA.
146 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, 15,564 (July 31, 2007)
(statement of Comm'r Jonathan Adelstein) ("I have heard the plea of 250,000
consumers who submitted comments in support of open access. I have heard the
concerns of Silicon Valley's best minds expressing frustration with their
inability to innovate in the wireless space. I have heard the public safety
community's cry for help, and their willingness to join their spectrum with a
commercial provider in order to create a unique public-private partnership. And
we've responded.")
147 Richard E. Wiley & Martha E. Heller, Communications Law 2007, 25TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 249,256

(PLI, 2007) ("In a nod to open access principles, the new regulations require
that, subject to certain restrictions, licensees of a portion of this band must allow
customer, device manufacturers, third-party application developers, and others
to use devices and applications of their choice. The agency declined, however,
to require that the spectrum be made available to third parties at wholesale
prices, as some parties have strongly advocated.").
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Commission's plan "open-access lite,"I 48 commentators quickly
pointed out that while the Commission's plan would require a
certain measure of openness with respect to devices and
applications, the plan would have no effect on consumers who
obtain wireless service on the existing cellular network
operators.149 True "open access," they contended, would require
the licensee to offer some portion of the spectrum on a wholesale
basis with no restrictions on devices and applications.'
According to the critics, the Commission had floated what
amounted to a far cry from legitimate open access and dubiously
passed it off as genuine."'
The Commission also adopted the final band plan for the 700MHz frequency range.'5 2 Responding to concepts outlined in the
Art Brodsky, FCC Plays Games With Wireless Competition, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE POLICY BLOG, July 10, 2007, http://www.publicknowledge
.org/node/1080 (repudiating the plan's legitimacy as true open access).
149 Id. ("[The Commission] made it appear as if [it] was about to embark on a
148

new, glorious age for consumers .

. .

. The new glorious age of cellphone

liberation wouldn't apply to the millions of phones operating now on existing
networks. It's not clear how a service offered by Verizon in the newly
auctioned spectrum would work if it could also connect to the existing
spectrum.").
'o Id. ("The public-interest community and the high-tech companies see
"open-access" as requiring the winners of the spectrum auction to offer a slice of
the space on a wholesale basis with no rules on what types of services or
equipment could be offered. That's a far cry even from loosened rules on a new
slice of spectrum owned by existing companies."); Center for Democracy &
Technology, supra note 50 ("[T]he best way to substantially increase users'
choice for broadband providers is to allow multiple retail ISPs to pay for access
to the licensees' spectrum [on a wholesale basis].").
151 Brodsky, supra note 148 ("In theory, a true "open access" regime could go
some way to creating some competition in the wireless world in which there are
four or five major companies which each have similar ways of doing business
.... A true open access regime could allow Google, or satellite companies, or
any sort smaller entrepreneur with a great idea the chance to offer something
newer and different from what the existing carriers provide.
If [the
Commission's] plan holds up, they may never get a chance.").
152 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 314 (July 31, 2007) ("In light
of the importance of such a network to the public interest, as well as the
difficulty of assessing an appropriate reserve price prior to an initial auction . . .
we believe that a D Block-specific aggregate reserve of approximately $1.33
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Frontline proposal, a Network Sharing Agreement ("NSA") would
govern both the commercial licensee and the Public Safety
Broadband Licensee ("PSBL") in their uses of the D Block and the
public safety bands respectively.'
The NSA would also set a
relatively high performance standard for operation of the
nationwide network.154 At the core of the NSA would be the
operational principle of public safety preemption of commercial
use on an as-needed basis."' Thus, in times of emergency, the
PSBL could override the D Block's commercial transmissions in a
temporary public safety takeover.'5 6
Despite earlier suggestions by various parties that an open
marketplace would work to achieve the goals sought in the
partnership without such restrictions on the license,'
the
Commission rejected the notion because it lacked confidence that
billion is appropriate given our goal of enabling the recovery of a portion of the
value of the spectrum while also permitting licensing to proceed as quickly as
possible. If, however, the D Block-specific aggregate reserve is not met, we
conclude that we should leave open the possibility of re-offering the license on
the same terms in a subsequent auction, as well as the possibility of reevaluating all or some of the applicable license conditions.").
15 Id. (explaining the contractual role the NSA will have in the interplay
between the D Block licensee and the PSBL).
154Id.
364 ("We find that the development of a nationwide broadband
interoperability standard is imperative. Having a common standard will lead to
the development of common network and subscriber equipment, and thus enable
the economies of scale we envision for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee.
Furthermore, once a common standard is adopted, all public safety entities will
be required to follow this standard in order to participate in the nationwide
broadband network.").
.ss Id. T 388 ("The commercial network would have access to the public safety
broadband spectrum on a secondary basis, and broadband public safety users
would have priority access to the network in times of emergency.").
15 id.

In re Reallocation of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777-792)
From Commercial Use, Petitionfor Rule Making, at 22 (filed by Cyren Call
Commc'ns Corp.) (Apr. 27, 2006). Cyren Call claimed that its PSST model
would create "self-sustaining financing." The proposal would give private
companies incentives to build and maintain a national network and provide the
best services to public safety at the best prices. The proposal would not, unlike
Frontline's proposal, require a single D Block licensee to enter into a
public/private agreement with the public-safety entities. Id.
1
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any service provider would agree to such an arrangement on a
nationwide basis.'
Furthermore, the Commission specified
parameters for the shared wireless broadband network, including
features relating to the technology platform, signal coverage,
robustness, reliability, capacity, security, operational capabilities,
and control, along with certain equipment specifications.'"
Compliance by the commercial licensee with these specifications
would ensure the fluid interoperability and compatibility of the
commercial network with standards required by the PSBL.'60
Additionally, the Commission revisited previous findings on
the size of market areas slated for auction, the amount of spectrum
in each license, and the possible need to tighten build-out rules. "'
The Commission set forth safeguards governing the establishment,
execution, and application of the NSA and provided operational
guidelines for the spectrum and contingency measures in case of
either party's breach of the NSA.'62 These safeguards would
primarily serve to protect the public safety broadband service in
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
Bands,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R.
8064 12 (Apr. 25, 2007). See generally In re Service Rules for the 698-746,
747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R.
15,289 1397 (July 31, 2007).
The Commission was not persuaded by proposals offered by others,
presumably Cyren Call, that suggested alternatives to a public-private
partnership would achieve the same public-safety interest result, explaining:
158

For example, if we merely provided incentives for carriers
voluntarily to enter into equivalent partnerships, we could not
be confident that any carrier would actually agree to such an
arrangement on a nationwide basis. Such ad hoc partnerships
could occur at a local or regional level, leaving large areas of
the nation without an interoperable public safety network.
Separate, independently-created public/private networks could
also operate on different spectrum, making interoperability
across the different networks difficult to achieve.
Id; see also Movshin, supra note 5, at 99 (explaining the Commission's
hesitance to adopt a model that would rely so much on private entity build-outs).
159 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
140-251.
60
Id. 403-469.
161 Id. See generally Movshin, supra
note 5, at 99.
162 See Second Report and Order,22 F.C.C.R.
15,289 444-454.
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the case of a breach of obligation by the commercial licensee. 163
Although few groups appeared completely satisfied with the
Commission's rules for usage of the D Block, both the incumbent
cellular network operators and several non-traditional, potential
competitors continued to show interest in the auction.'"
D. THE AUCTION AND ITS FALLOUT
The Commission set the D Block's reserve at $1.33 billion for
the March auction.165 The high bid for the license, however, was
well below the reserve' 6 and left government officials and public
safety advocates worried that efforts to build the nationwide,
interoperable public-safety network had stalled.'16 Moreover, it
appeared as though one of the legacy providers had momentarily
nabbed the D Block,'16 leaving the feisty would-be providers out of
the fold and quashing any hope of a new market entrant.169
6 Id.; see Wiley & Heller, supra note 147, at 270 ("Further, the FCC
provided means for public safety entities to: (1) obtain an earlier build-out of
broadband networks than provided for in the NSA; (2) build their own
broadband networks in areas not included in the NSA; and (3) conduct wideband
operations via a limited and conditioned waiver process.").
164 See Movshin, supra note
5, at 99.
165 In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses
Scheduled for January 16, 2008,
Public Notice, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,004 I 51-52 (Aug. 17, 2007) ("[I]n light of the
D Block license conditions essential to the public safety purpose of the
public/private partnership, it might be appropriate to expect bidders to bid only
about 75 percent to 80 percent of such an amount, or about $1.33 billion.").
166 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 2 (Mar. 20, 2008).
167 Auction Winners Announce Plans, While D Block Sits, Multichannel Video
Compliance Guide: Broadband Law & Regulation Newsletter 16 NO. 3
Multichannel
Video
Compliance
Guide
Newsl.
(Thompson Publishing Group, Inc.), May 2008, at 2 (explaining the state of
concern for the D block ensuing after the unsuccessful auction).
168 Silva, supra note 26 (citing Oversight of the Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n-the
700 MHz Auction Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecommc'ns and the Internet
(Apr. 15, 2008) [hereinafter "FCC Oversight Hearing"]) ("At present, it looks
like two mega-resorts are going up on the beachfront in the form of Verizon
[Wireless] and AT&T [Mobility], solidifying their wireless market and spectrum
real estate positions.").
169 Id. ("There is no new national competitor to provoke new broadband
competition, innovation, and consumer choice coming out of the auction.").
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In response, the Commission sought comment on how to
proceed with the re-auction and licensing of the D Block' and
continued to emphasize the importance of maximizing the publicsafety and commercial benefits of the proposed nationwide
interoperable public-safety network.17 ' However, in a departure
from the public/private partnership model, the Commission, at
least briefly, mulled dropping the idea of the public/private
partnership and turned to the public for alternative ideas to fund
the build-out of a public-safety network.'72 Policymakers also
presented the idea of a re-auction of the D Block free of conditions
as a viable option to recover the value of the spectrum."' However
the re-auction unfolded, the Commission would proceed sans
backdoor this time, cautioning that "additional actions by Congress
may be necessary to support the cost and build-out of a nationwide,
interoperable broadband network for America's first responders."' 74

1o In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second FurtherNotice ofProposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 8047 17 (May 14,
2008) ("We invite comment broadly on these principles and goals, as well as the
specific subjects discussed herein. While today's item raises a number of
specific questions, it should not be seen as providing any limitation on the public
safety issues we seek comment upon.").
1' Id. While the Commission opened up discussion to ideas not in line with
the public/private partnership, it maintained the public/private partnership,
perhaps with some minor rules modifications, as the best option to achieve its
public safety goal. Id.
172 Id.
1 ("[W]e . . . consider[] revisions to this partnership as well as
alternative rules we should adopt in the event the D Block licensee is no longer
required to enter into a mandatory public/private partnership."); Auction
Winners Announce Plans, supra note 167; Donny Jackson, House Hearing

Focuses on D Block, URGENT COMMUNICATIONS, Apr. 15, 2008 ("[V]irtually

every member of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
stated that developing a nationwide broadband network that would enable
interoperable public safety communications is a high priority.").
1
FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168 (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams
(R-Fla.)).
174 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Seeks Comment on How to
Proceed with the Reauction of the 700 MHz D Block Spectrum and Creation of
a Nationwide, Interoperable Public Safety Broadband Network (May 14, 2008),
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-282151Al
.pdf.
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In September 2008, the Commission resolved to retain the
framework for the public-private partnership absent some other
type of funding for the nationwide interoperable public-safety
network."' The Commission followed up on prior proposed rules
changes, fine-tuned rules changes proposals"' and revised the
auction plan for assigning licenses."' One proposed licensing
change of note was the possibility of offering regional licenses, as
opposed to the original nationwide license around which the
public/private partnership had been designed."'
The modified licensing format would require the holding of
two auctions in parallel: one for fifty-eight regional licenses and
one for a single nationwide license."' While the nationwide
license would receive priority bidding,'" the Commission would
award regional licenses on a contingency basis if both the
nationwide bids did not reach the reserve-now set at $750
million-and successful bids were made for regional licenses

In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 2 (Sept. 25,
2008) ("[W]e tentatively conclude that we should continue to require, as a
license condition, that the D Block licensee enter into a public/private
partnership with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee for the purpose of
constructing a wireless broadband network that will operate over both D Block
spectrum and public safety broadband spectrum and provide broadband services
to both commercial users and public safety entities (shared wireless broadband
network). We find that a public/private partnership condition on the D Block
remains the best option to achieve nationwide buildout of an interoperable
broadband network for public safety entities, given the current absence of
legislative appropriations for this purpose and the limited funding available to
the public safety sector.").
176 See generally id.
59-239.
17 See generally id.
240-311.
"' Id. 1 3 ("With regard to the appropriate geographic area, we propose to
offer the D Block both as a single nationwide license and on a regional basis
17

Id. 1 242 ("If the provisionally winning bids do not cover at least half of
the nation's population, the auction will be cancelled and no D Block licenses
will be awarded based on the results of the auction.").
0
Id. ("[T]he high bid on the nationwide, technology platform alternative
would be the provisionally winning bid over any aggregate bid(s) covering less
population in the two sets of regional licenses . ...).
179
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covering at least half the U.S. population.'"'
Should the
Commission adopt the regional licensing scheme, the holders of
the licenses would work together to achieve the ultimate goal of
interoperability through migration to the technology chosen by the
PSBL.18 2 Should the nationwide bids not reach the reserve and less
than half of the U.S. population be covered by successfully
auctioned regional licenses, the auction would be cancelled and the
Commission would award no licenses. 83
Although the notion of a singular nationwide license may no
longer apply in the regional contingency, the proposal would still
require all licensees to enter into the NSA as part of the nowregional public/private partnerships.' 84 In addition to the growing
consideration of the regional approach as a possible option, talk
also surfaced about the possibility of reducing system design and
priority access requirements to make the D Block spectrum more
palatable to potential commercial bidders.'18
III. How SHOULD THE COMMISSION PROCEED WITH THE REAUCTION OF THE D BLOCK?

In moving forward with the D Block, the Commission must
consider several current political and societal issues.
The
181 Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 T 242
("[T]he high bid on the nationwide, technology platform alternative would be
the provisionally winning bid over any aggregate bid(s) covering less population

in the two sets of regional licenses . . . ."); see id.

246 ("[W]e tentatively

conclude, as an initial matter, that we will not award any licenses unless the total
population covered by licenses with high bids meets or exceeds fifty percent
(50%) of the U.S. population."); Cecilia Kang, FCC Plans New Action for FirstResponder Airwaves, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 6, 2008, at D2, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090503500.html.
182 Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
256.
In the case that a regional model was, after all, adopted, the Commission would
require the individual commercial licensees to submit detailed proposals from
the would-be licensees. Those proposals would then be reviewed by the
Commission and the PSBL together to determine whether such proposals would
meet the needs as prescribed by the public safety network. Id.
183

Id.

184 See id.
185

59-75.
See generally id.

81-13 1.
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transition between presidential administrations and the change of
guard in political parties signals a change in Commission
leadership is around the corner. The need for a presidentiallyappointed Democratic Commission chairman to fill the position
vacated by Republican Kevin Martin has in effect suspended D
Block rulemaking indefinitely."'
The administration's
understandable focus on the sickly economy has left Interim
Chairman Michael Copps at the helm for the moment.'
This
current economic climate is uncertain not only for consumers but
also for businesses, including those that make up the
telecommunications industry.'
Moreover, nothing close to a consensus has been reached with
respect to the "unified front" the public-safety world had in mind
for the usage of the Public Safety spectrum.189 Exacerbating the
matter is the recent departure of Cyren Call as the PSST's
technology advisor due to inadequate compensation.190
Commentators note Cyren Call's technological expertise and
But cf Amy Schatz & Laura Meckler, Obama to Tap Tech Advisor as FCC
Chief WALL ST. J.,
Jan.
13,
2009,
at B7,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB 123180775460975639-lMyQjAxMDI5
MzExMzgxMDM3Wj.html (noting that reports indicate Julius Genachowski,
the Obama campaign's technology advisor, will be Martin's successor, although
no official appointment date as been reported).
187 Id. The replacement of the existing administration likely marked the end
of the clock for Commission deliberation with respect to the re-auction.
188 Steve Taylor & Jim Metzler, Economic Downturn Not Affecting 2009
Telecom Budgets, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.
networkworld.com/newsletters/frame/2009/011909wan2.html (noting that while
telecommunication company budgets will remain essentially the same despite
the economy, some negative impacts will be experienced by those companies as
a result of the economy).
189 See Matthew Lasar, Cyren Call May Quit D Block Role, ARS TECHNICA,
Nov. 10, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/11/cyren-call-may-quitd-block-role.ars (noting that the debate over national and regional approaches
has not settled, and it appears basic assumptions that were previously
unquestioned, such as the need for complete interoperability between different
public-safety jurisdictions, might be second-guessed by some).
190 Press Release, Cyren Call & Public Safety Spectrum Trust, PSST and
Cyren Call End Advisory Relationship (Mar. 6, 2009), availableat http://www.
cyrencall.com/media/documents/JointPressRelease_030609.pdf.
186
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willingness to accommodate the PSST's compensation terms as
reasons no other advisor would be fitting for the position. 91
After attributing the March auction's floundering to
uncertainty, risk, and fear of high network-operation costs by
potential bidders, 9 2 the Commission admitted that it "still [did not]
have the level of technical and economic data and expertise" it
needed to ascertain the most efficient and effective way to
implement a nationwide interoperable public-safety network. 93
Going forward, what should the Commission do to safeguard
against repeat underbidding and to reinforce commitment to the
public/private partnership, whether under a regional model or a
nationwide model? To form an educated opinion about the best
remedy, one must weigh the idealism of trying to maximize the
benefit to the public against the practicalities of legislation and
business. 94 Beneath it all lies the impetus of "the public interest."
191 Lasar, supra note 189.

Letter from Kent R. Nilsson, Inspector General, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
to Kevin Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, at 26 (April 25, 2008),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC281791Al.pdf ("[W]e conclude that . .. the many layers of uncertainty and risk,
and the growing prospect of high network costs ... were responsible for
potential bidders' decisions not to bid."); see Brodsky, supra note 35 ("The
reasons [for the drastic underbidding on the D Block in the March auction] are
of the public safety community's own making, along with their allies, Cyren
Call. They set conditions before the auction took place which no commercial
192

company in its right mind would even think about meeting ....

On one hand,

public safety had every right to come into a potential negotiation asking for the
moon. On the other hand, it wasn't very smart because it scared away the
people who could do the most for it and did so in a way that tarnished the
reputation of first responders and public safety.").
193 Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, En Banc Hearing on Public Safety
Interoperable Communications-The 700 MHz D Block Proceeding (July 30,
2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/presentations/2008/073008/
[hereinafter "FCC En Banc Public Hearing"] (statement of Michael Copps,
Senior Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, at 1).
194 Lance & Wachs, supra note 74 ("To achieve the greatest public benefit, the
FCC will need to find common ground and balance among many competing
interests and ideas. For example, a public-safety communications network
might best be achieved by dedicating some of the bandwidth solely for such use
....

On the other hand, a public/private partnership with a combined

infrastructure built out and usable for commercial purposes but with emergency
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A. Evaluating the Public Interest
The legislation and Commission rulemaking preceding the
March 2008 auction contain numerous references to the "public
interest".' But rarely do the documents ever scratch further than
the surface, usually stating plainly that the public interest can be
found in "public safety," "competition," or in retrieving a fair
amount for the public resource that is the radio frequency
spectrum."' If the driving force behind the auction of the D Block
was, in fact, the public interest, one must examine the public
interest piecemeal.
1. The Interest ofRapid Deployment to Achieve Public Safety
Public safety, the most pressing of the public interests bearing
on the auction, had been invoked as a foundational cornerstone in
developing the model for the public/private partnership.'9 7 Early
on, the Commission identified rapid deployment of the national
interoperable public-safety network as the key to achieving the
public-safety goal for which the Commission had created the
public/private partnership.'98
If the ultimate goal is to create an interoperable public-safety
network, how can the Commission ensure that the network is
rapidly deployed and, once deployed, is robust and fully
functional? Though speed of deployment and functionality of the
end product would both seem to serve the interest of public safety,
given the wrong circumstances, the two could work against each
other.
For instance, to license the D Block on a national basis to
anyone other than one of the existing telecom mainstays, namely
and public-safety usage always preempting in the designated frequencies could
yield a more rapidly deployed, robust infrastructure.").
195 See In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
386-529 (July 31,
2007). See generally 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
196 See Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289
386-529.
See Alan Pearce, An Analysis of the Public Safety & Homeland
197 Id.
Security Benefits of an Interoperable Nationwide Emergency Communications
Network at 700 MIz Built by a Public-PrivatePartnership, 16 MEDIA L. &
POt'Y 41, 47-48 (2006).
198

See generally 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006).
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Verizon or AT&T, would necessarily risk the compromise of either
a quick build-out or the network's functionality."' In other words,
few service providers outside the telecom duopoly possess the
wherewithal to speedily build the network without compromising
its functionality.2 00
On the other hand, licensing the D Block on a regional level
may not pose precisely the same risk. But such a model would still
present its own share of network interoperability and quality
assurance issues.20 ' And while regional build-outs may provide for
quicker regional coverage than that provided for by the nationwide
model, attempting to coordinate build-outs and operation among
fifty-eight regional licensees would undoubtedly come with its
own set of drawbacks.20 2
Although the rollout of a high-quality, functionally robust
network should not be expected tomorrow, the interest of public
safety in rapid deployment is best protected by putting the D Block
in the hands of those service providers with the resources to affect
the quickest and most useful network.203 Because the Commission
currently considers both regional and national approaches, the
question of which licensee(s) might affect the best balance of rapid
deployment and functional end product may vary greatly
depending on which approach is adopted.

199 Quinn, supra note 138, at 2-3 ("The Commission is under a statutory
mandate in this proceeding to encourage broadband deployment, and each of the
Commissioners has expressly emphasized that goal as a primary aim here.
There can be no serious dispute that existing wireless providers, having already
invested billions in deploying 3G wireless broadband networks, are best situated
to utilize the 700 MHz band to further that deployment. Yet, far from ensuring
that the spectrum available here is placed 'in the hands of those who can best put
it to work' fulfilling the Commission's objective of widespread broadband
deployment, Google's proposal is specifically designed to ensure the opposite
result.").
200 id.
201

202
203

Jackson, supranote 172 (citing statement of Rep. Jane Harman, D-Calif).
Id.
Quinn, supra note 138, at 2-3.
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2. The Interest of Maximizing Use of the Spectrum by Obtaining
Fair Value
In selling or licensing radio frequency spectrum, the
Commission must act as a surrogate for the public in striving to
attain the best possible value for the resource. 2 0 Although the
March 2008 auction exceeded the aggregate reserve price for all of
the licenses offered, the outcome did not serve the specific public
interest in the D Block because the reserve price for the D Block
was not met. 205 Accordingly, this disparity between the aggregate
and specific public interests requires each of them to be examined
independently.
On the whole, the auction retrieved over $19 billion when the
aggregate reserve was set at just over $10 billion. 206 Thus,
accepting the reserve prices as true reflections of the deserved
market value at the time, the value received by the public for all
spectral bands was almost double the aggregate fair value, an
inarguable success.20 7
The high bid in the D Block auction, however, was
approximately $900 million less than expected-not even half of
its appraised value.208 When viewed in light of the $9 billion
surplus created by the auction of the other blocks, the $900 million
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)(3)(C) (1934) (stating the
objectives of competitive bidding auctions).
205 In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 1 2 (Mar. 20, 2008).
204

206 id.
207

Letter from Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, MEDIA ACCESS
PROJECT, to Kevin Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, at 3 (Mar. 19,
2008), available at http://www.mediaaccess.org/filedownload/220/DBlock
Commission
can
take
("[T]he
%201tr%20to%20Martin%20FWR.pdf
considerable pride in the successes of Auction 73. Auction 73 attracted 214
qualified bidders, all blocks with the exception of D Block met their reserve
prices, and only eight licenses failed to attract a provisional winning bid. In
addition, the auction revenue nearly doubled the projection of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). Compare these statistics with the purportedly 'wildly
successful' AWS auction in 2006 (Auction 66), which attracted only 168
qualified bidders, and where large conglomerates won national footprints at-in
the words of the cable consortium Spectrum Co.-'attractive prices."').
208 Auction Closing Notice, 23 F.C.C.R.
4572 1 2.
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shortcoming pales in comparison. But when viewed in terms of
the specific public interest in the D Block, selling an increasingly
scarce resource for only 35% of its $1.33 billion appraised value
would have been criminal.
But public interest is a function of time and circumstances.
While the public's pre-auction interest may have been to meet the
reserves set by the Commission, its interest changed the moment
the D Block was conditionally left on the auction block. At that
point, the licenses for the other blocks had been auctioned and the
only remaining public interest was in obtaining fair value for the D
Block. Thus, retrospectively appreciating the great success of the
auction on the whole does not change the fact that the public's
interest can only be met by successful recovery of the D Block's
value, which has yet to be determined.
Following the March 2008 auction, the Commission admitted
that balancing the commercial viability of the D Block license with
the murky obligations tied to the commercial license was an
exercise fraught with difficulty; a first run at which, somewhat
understandably, went awry.20 Now the Commission has proposed
an adjusted reserve tag for the D Block of $750 million for the
future auction, which is half of the March 2008 reserve. 210 This
might show that the original reserve was a misappraisal of value in
light of the obligations and that $750 million was a fair return to
the public all along. Or it might constitute an open admission by
the Commission that it is willing to slash prices to achieve its
public-safety goal.
Given the difficulties in valuing something as intangible as a
block of spectrum-not to mention trying to adjust its price in
contemplation of a return service provided by the buyer-the real
meaning of the lowered reserve is unclear. Regardless of whether
the future auction results in favor of national or regional licensing,
the vague nature of the relation between the D Block's monetary
In re Auction of the D-Block License in the 758-763 and 788-793 MHz
Bands, Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 5421, 5424 (Mar. 20, 2008) (statement of Comm'r
Jonathan Adelstein) ("It is nothing short of a tragedy that the D Block failed to
sell.").
2W0See Kang, supra
note 181.
209
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auction value and the return it will provide to the public makes the
determination of whether the public is receiving fair value an
exercise in futility.211
3. The InterestofPromoting Competition
Though the public interest in marketplace competition seems to
have been relegated to the back burner since September, a close
examination still sheds light on an important, albeit less pertinent,
aspect of the spectrum auction. Notably, the promotion of
competition in the context of the D Block auction flies in the face
of the highly prioritized rapid deployment for the interest of public

safety.2 12
Here is how the two are at odds: When AT&T argued against
open access rules as a means to allow the D Block to naturally fall
into the hands of whoever would make best use of it, it discounted
the public interest of marketplace competition. 213
AT&T's
argument stressed allowing the auction to unfold in a manner that
would empower those companies who could make quick, efficient
use of the spectrum.214 While those companies would likely make
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
Bands,
ThirdFurtherNotice ofProposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301, 14508 (Sept.
25, 2008) (statement of Comm'r Jonathan S. Adelstein, concurring in part,
211

dissenting in part) ("[W]e have no way to determine . . . whether such a large

upfront minimum bid requirement of $750 million permits a sustainable
business model, or dooms this enterprise to failure from the outset. There is no
analysis provided in the item to explain this number. We are offering for sale a
valuable asset, but not one of unlimited value. And we are expecting major
investments to be made by private enterprise to meet the needs of public safety.
Despite these hurdles, we have not undertaken to assess whether the costs we are
asking the private sector to bear have any relationship to the returns it can
expect. I would have preferred to see much of the amount that will go to the
minimum bid to go to building out the network rather than paying for the
spectrum.").
212 See Quinn, supranote 138. Although AT&T claimed to be promoting both
rapid deployment and competition, industry critics were not thrown by their
characterization of competition, as it differs vastly from the competition
envisioned by the technology companies and most consumer advocates. Id. See
generally Brodsky, supra note 148.
213 Quinn, supra note
138, at 2.
214 Id. ("Even putting aside the misconceived nature
of Google's specific
proposals-a matter discussed in more detail below--Google's approach is
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most efficient use of the spectrum, they would also necessarily
stymie competition by continuing to hold the limited amount of
telecom industry clout above the heads of those would-be
providers looking to break into the industry. 215 And although
AT&T never explicitly appealed to the Commission's public safety
sympathies, the service provider would have been well-advised to
ring the public safety chime at least once in its ex parte filing.216
After all, what it referred to as "efficient use" 217 of the spectrum
throughout that filing could have, as a logical extension, easily
been tied in with the Commission's public safety goal.2 18
On the other hand, when Google advocated competition via
open access rules to favor technology-based internet companies, it
deprioritized public safety. 219 Those technology-based internet
companies, while possibly providing more competition and
innovation, could not use the spectrum nearly as efficiently as the
larger service providers. 22 0 Thus, if AT&T's and Google's D
Block arguments support one proposition, it is that promoting
either public safety or increased competition necessarily comes at
the expense of the other.

fatally at odds with the basic purpose of auctioning spectrum.
The
Commission's charge here is to identify-and to award spectrum to-precisely
those companies that Google seeks to exclude from the auction: the companies
that value the spectrum most and that will put it to its most efficient use.").
215 Quinn, supra note 138; Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note
50 ("[R]ecent changes to the legal regime raise the possibility that [existing]
network operators could seek to exercise more 'gatekeeper' control over what
online services or applications their customers use. Creation of a viable wireless
broadband option could help provide a competitive check against any efforts to
move in that direction.").
216 Quinn, supranote
138.
217 Id. at 2 ("The Commission's charge here is
to identify-and to award
spectrum to-precisely those companies that Google seeks to exclude from the
auction: the companies that value the spectrum most and that will put it to its
most efficient use.") (emphasis added); id. ("Because existing providers value
the spectrum more and are better situated to put it to more efficient use, Google
complains, they are willing to pay more for it.") (emphasis added).
2 18

id.

219

Schmidt, supra note 126.
Id.

220
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Examining the Commission's Options Through the Lens of
B.
the Public Interest
Since the March auction, commentators have generally taken
three distinct positions on the direction in which the Commission
should move with the D Block. Having reviewed the competing
interests at play, this section discusses how each of those positions
either meets or fails to meet those interests. Although strongest
immediately following the auction, since then support for the first
two positions discussed has deflated considerably. Still, these
positions merit review because of their common strands with the
third position, which currently carries the most support but
contains within it two battleground issues that divide its
proponents. As the following shows, each position stresses certain
strains of the aforementioned public interests while leaving other
aspects unaddressed or under-addressed.
1. The Commission Should Accept the Auction Results and Focus
its Efforts on Assisting the Commercial Licensee with Rapid
Deployment of the Nationwide InteroperablePublic-Safety
Network
With the Commission taking $9 billion more than expected
from the auction in whole, public safety advocates say there may
be no need to set a reserve price at all on the D Block upon reauction.2 2' They insist that the Commission should focus its efforts
on helping to address the significant network-cost issues for the
commercial licensee.222 Although such a path would not translate
immediately into the front-end dollars anticipated in other
proposals, the investment by both the Commission and the
commercial licensee in the nationwide deployment would manifest
itself later.223
The U.S. spends over $10 billion annually on recovering from
catastrophic events, and the occurrence of such events is predicted
to increase considerably over the coming years.224 Having a robust,
Auction Winner Announce Plans, supra note 167.
Id.
223 Pearce, supra note 197, at
48.
224 Id. ("The continued expansion of development in coastal areas, combined
with the expansion of major urban areas, is dramatically increasing costs
221

222
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interoperable public safety network in place would allow for
quicker reaction to such occurrences, undoubtedly minimizing
unnecessary damage to property and losses of life. 225 Thus, while
the Commission may seek to make immediate contributions to the
Treasury,226 the delayed gratification of the savings associated with
the nation's quickened disaster reflexes may actually effect a better
financial, not to mention public safety, service to the U.S. 227
Moreover, most public safety advocates contend that the
Commission should hold fast to the nationwide concept instead of
considering a regional licensing model.228 Proponents of this view
explain that the incompatibility among existing regional public
safety networks has resulted from years of such regional efforts
despite a more recent push to consolidate regional

associated with disasters. Major catastrophe loss projections range from $25
billion to nearly $85 billion a year."); see Insurance Information Institute, Facts
& Statistics, Inflation-Adjusted U.S. Catastrophe Losses by Cause of Loss,
1986-2005, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/catastrophes/;
CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE OF H. R. 230 NATURAL DISASTER PROTECTION
AND
INSURANCE
ACT OF
1997 (Oct. 8,
1997), available at

http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfmn?index=1 57.
225 Pearce, supra note
197, at 49.
226 47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(8)(E)(iii) (2006) (setting a firm
deadline for transfer of
auction proceeds to the U.S. Treasury).
227 Pearce, supra note
197, at 49.
228
FCC En Banc Public Hearing,supra note 193 (statement of Robert
Gurss,
Dir., Legal & Gov't Affairs, Ass'n of Public Safety Commc'ns Officials Int'l,
Inc., at 2) [hereinafter "FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Gurss Statement"]
("Public safety communications are usually provided through land mobile radio
systems operated by and serving a single agency or jurisdiction. That allows
systems to be designed to meet agencies' specific operational and coverage
requirements within their unique geographical constraints, while also providing
agencies with unfettered control over their communications systems. However,
separate radio systems (which can be in any of four different portions of the
radio spectrum) have also led to significant problems over time in many cases,
including overly specialized radio systems and specifications, expensive radio
equipment with a limited number of vendors, duplication of infrastructure,
inadequate interoperability, and inefficient use of scarce radio spectrum.
Fortunately, there has been a trend in recent years towards consolidation of
public safety radio systems to serve larger areas, such as a county, region, or
state. However, there continues to be substantial variations in land mobile radio
systems across the nation, with critical gaps in interoperability.").

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

360

[VOL. 10: 313

communications.2 29 They conclude that it is a regional licensing
scheme that created the very problem of existing gaps in
interoperability, so a new regional licensing model provides no
remedy.230
2. The Commission Should Sever the D Block From the Public
Safety Spectrum and Re-Auction With Focus on Promoting
IncreasedCompetition
While the D Block served as a key piece in the proposed deal
to affect a nationwide build-out of a public safety network since
the plan's inception, some critics argue the plan was doomed to fail
due to a lack of funding.2 3' Married to the public-private
partnership for almost a decade now, critics insist the Commission
should consider its mission mandated by the DTV Act to be
complete.23 2 Statutorily speaking, the DTV Act required only that
the Commission commence an auction of licenses for the 700 MHz
spectrum by January 28, 2008, and that the Commission deposit
the corresponding proceeds in the Treasury by June 30, 2008.233
Having held the auction in hopes of securing funding for support in
the build-out, and having deposited the proceeds from the
successfully auctioned blocks in the Treasury, the Commission has
satisfied the DTV Act mandate according to some commentators.2 34

229

23 0

id

id.
Feld, supra note 207, at 2 ("Certainly the same concerns that drove the
Commission to adopt the current D Block rules continue to shape the
Commission's choices today. Congress ordered construction of a national
interoperable broadband safety network without providing sufficient funding to
pay for it. But the Commission must consider whether the concept of a
public/private partnership is workable-and if so under what terms.").
232 Id. ("The Commission has held the required auction, and will presumably
deposit the revenue by the deadline.
As some licenses always remain
unassigned after an auction, a fact of which Congress must surely be aware after
more than ten years of experience with FCC auctions, the statutory command to
hold an auction, absent something more, cannot reasonably be interpreted as a
requirement to dispose of all the spectrum before June 30.").
231

233 Id.

Id. ("As an initial matter, the Commission should consider that it has
fulfilled its obligations under the Digital Transition Act of 2005.").
234
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Further, they contend that instead of beating the unworkable
dead horse that is the public-private partnership, it would be wiser
to sever the D Block from the public safety spectrum altogether.235
Once severed, the Commission could use the spectrum to promote
increased competition and enhance broadband deployment by
auctioning the unencumbered D Block license(s) in essentially the
same manner it auctioned the A, B, C, and E Blocks in March.236
While pre-auction figures by the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that, without conditions, the entire 700-MHz spectrum
would raise a total $12.5 billion at auction, other studies expected
an auction free of conditions to raise $25 to $30 billion.237
While advocates of D Block severance endorse a platform of
increased auction proceeds and fostering competition, they also
criticize the feasibility of the public-private partnership.238 A 10MHz public safety band, they claim, may be insufficient to handle
the heavy communications traffic certain to occur in the case of a
large-scale crisis.239 Furthermore, the preemptive nature of the
Id. at 3 ("The successes of Auction 73 are the direct result of the
Commission conducting several rulemakings to consider a broad range of
controversial and unorthodox options. Some of these, such as anonymous
bidding, proved wildly successful. Others, such as the attempt to create a
public/private partnership, proved unsuccessful. But the Commission must not
allow the failure of D Block to reduce it to timidity and investigation of only
conventional solutions. Instead, the Commission should transform the failure of
the D Block to attract sufficient bidders into an opportunity to investigate how
this last piece of unencumbered 'beachfront' spectrum can best serve the public
interest.").
235

236

Id.

Silva, supra note 26 (citing FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168
(statement of Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas)) ("True, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated the auction would raise $12.5 billion. But other studies
estimated that, without the conditions, the spectrum would raise $25 to $30
billion. I think that the higher estimates would have been about right, based on
the results where the C-Block revenue was about half of what many folks
thought, and the D Block did not sell at all.")).
238 Jackson, supra note 172 (citing FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168
(statement of Harlin McEwen, Chairman, PSST)).
239 Id. (citing FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168 (statement of Harlin
McEwen, Chairman, PSST)); see Pearce, supra note 197, at 49. See FCC En
Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Richard Taylor, Senior
Technologist, Tyco Electronics M/A-Com) ("10 MHz may be insufficient to
237
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public safety transmissions over commercial transmissions would
hinder the marketability of the commercial network to prospective
advertisers.240
The uncertainty involved in the cost estimates of the
nationwide build-out, those who recommend D Block severance
suggest, casts doubt on the auction proceeds' ability to adequately
fund the network without significant complement from the
government.24' Conversely, a regional licensing model for the
partnership would open the door to inconsistent reliability among
regional carriers, resulting in patchy public safety coverage in
some areas of the country and better coverage in others.242
3. The Commission Should Modify Rules to EncourageMore
Competitive Bidding While Re-auctioning the D Block Subject
to the Public/PrivatePartnership
According to the dominant view of the proposed auction, the
D Block should remain part of the public-private partnership and
the Commission should tailor some of the more rigid license
conditions to entice more bidders into the auction.243 Such
adaptations would likely include a lower reserve price 244 and
greater clarity regarding network build-out obligations and

accommodate many of the envisioned uses. Broadband networks are expected
to carry surveillance video from fixed surveillance cameras throughout a city to
public safety vehicles in the field. As typical [Internet Protocol] surveillance
video operates at 500 kbps-1.5 Mbps, the available 5 MHz of public safety
uplink spectrum can accommodate only a limited number of cameras per cell
before these fixed wireless video applications exhaust the spectrum.").
240 FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168 (statement of Coleman Bazelon,
Principal, Brattle Group) (speculating that the advertising slogan of such a
conditionally profitable network should be "[g]uaranteed NOT to work when
you need it most.") (emphasis added).
241 Id. (statement of Harlin McEwen, Chairman,
PSST).
242 Jackson, supra note 172 (citing statement of Rep. Jane Harman,
D-Cal.).
243 Id. (citing FCC OversightHearing,supra
note 168).
244 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762
and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 275 (Sept.
25, 2008) ("[W]e . . . tentatively conclude that it is in the public interest to ...

establish initial minimum opening bids for each set of alternative D Block
licenses that equal or aggregate approximately $750 million.").
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business models for the commercial licensee.24 5 Proponents claim
this compromise between public safety and broadband competition
interests to be the "last, best chance" 24 6 to bring to life a public
safety network without considerable federal appropriations.24 7
Within the general proposition, however, there are certain sticking
points, one of which is embodied in the ongoing debate between
proponents of a regional licensing model and proponents of
national licensing.248
a. A Regional Licensing Model
Of the few changes the Commission mentioned in September,
the most drastic one was a plan in which the Commission would
offer regional licenses instead of one national license. 249 A
regional licensing model favors smaller to mid-sized potential
licensees as it would permit participation by providers who may be
unable to compete on a nationwide scale but may have the
resources to build regional networks that could be leveraged to
rapidly deploy a nationwide system.250
Some proponents suggest this licensing scheme would provide
local public safety agencies with the necessary control to
determine the appropriate level of interplay between public safety
and commercial entities required to sustain the regional public-

245 Jackson, supra note 172 (citing FCC Oversight Hearing,supra note 168).

FCC Oversight Hearing, supra note 168 (statement of
Michael Copps,
Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n) ("I accepted the novel idea of a publicprivate spectrum partnership because it probably represents the last, best chance
to build a network that will work for public safety.").
246

247

Id.

See generally Third Further Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R.
14301 % 61-72.
249 Id. The Commission's considering of a regional model strayed a great deal
from the ideological position of "nationwide or bust" it seemed to espouse
before the D Block failed to sell. Id.
250 Id.
61 ("AT&T, Verizon Wireless, and smaller regional service
providers, such as MetroPCS, United States Cellular Corporation (US Cellular)
and Rural Telecommunications Group (RTG), prefer the multiple, regional
license approach for the D Block . . . ."). See FCC Oversight Hearing, supra
note 168 (statement of Robert Irving, General Counsel, Leap Wireless).
248
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private partnership.25 ' Moreover, regional licenses would allow
those areas with readily available local agencies and commercial
licensees to get the network deployment underway leading to
earlier maximization of the spectrum252 as well as allowing
commercial licensees to be particularly responsive to the unique
needs of state, regional, and local public safety agencies.253
See FCC En Banc Public Hearing,supra note 193 (statement of William
Andrle, Jr., Northrup Grumman Information Technology, at 2) [hereinafter
"FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Andrle Statement"] ("This 'network of
networks' approach can achieve faster build-out in some areas-and in areas
that might not ever be served. It also gives local entities more control over the
details of the network design serving their jurisdictions. These networks can be
harmonious with the proposed national shared network or-if for whatever
reason the public/private partnership does not come to fruition-the continued
organic growth of these networks over time can increasingly meet public
safety's needs."); FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of
Don Brittingham, Assistant Vice Pres., Public Affairs, Policy and Comm'n,
Verizon Corp., at 3) (supporting the regional licensing approach and rationale
presented by the New York Police Department (NYPD)); Interoperabilityin the
Next Administration: Assessing the Derailed 700 MHz D-block Public Safety
Spectrum Auction, Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 110th
Cong. 2-3 (2008) (statement of Charles Dowd, Deputy Chief, NYPD)
[hereinafter "Dowd Interoperability Statement"] http://homeland.house
.gov/SiteDocuments/ 20080916154150-70229.pdf.
252 See Dowd Interoperability Statement, supra note 251, at 2-3; FCC En
Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Stacey Black, Chairman,
Executive Director-Market Development, AT&T, Inc.) ("By leveraging a
commercial partner's existing facilities, local public safety entities can expedite
the deployment of wireless broadband facilities without having to wait for a
nationwide 700 MHz network to be constructed or devices to be developed.").
253 Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
71
("Regional licensees could coordinate with local public safety entities and
ensure that public safety communications are tailored to meet unique local needs
in particular geographic areas. PSR licensees may, for example, take into
account regional differences in terrain and public safety needs in determining
how to set up and operate the system, which could be more cost effective in
certain respects and better suited to regional needs than a one-size fits-all
system."); FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Charles
Dowd, Deputy Chief, NYPD) ("Both Philadelphia and San Francisco filed
comments in support of local or regional public safety broadband networks as
opposed to the proposed national network. We are also seeing manufacturers
publicly expressing interest in developing broadband mission critical voice and
data networks for public safety."); see id. (statement of Stacey Black, Chairman,
251
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Additionally, the model for licensing should reflect the needs on a
regional basis as the effects of emergency situations are more often
than not felt regionally, with local and regional agencies first to
assign responders. 254 According to regional licensing advocates,
sticking to the national license scheme will result in deployment
completion in 2012-at the earliest. 255
Technologically speaking, endorsers of the regional licensing
model insist that the Commission should allow regional licenses so
long as the systems employed meet or exceed the technical
requirements of the national network. 25 6 The much maligned issues
arising from the mesh of the different regional networks, they
emphasize, do not prohibit interoperability and can be overcome
Executive Dir.-Market Dev., AT&T, Inc.) ("The use of regional [licenses] ...
would facilitate the development of partnerships between public safety and
private entities to build regionally-based networks using the PSBL-developed
national interoperability standards and requirements.").
254 FCC En Banc Public Hearing,supra note 193 (statement of John Farmer,
Jr., Former Attorney Gen., New Jersey; Senior Counsel, 9/11 Comm'n) ("These
common elements [in our most recent emergencies] suggest an approach to
reallocating bandwidth that builds interoperability from the ground up, rather
than from the top down. In other words, because emergencies are lived at the
local and regional levels in the first instance, it is critical that interoperability be
assured at those levels first. As reflected in the submissions of New York,
Washington, and other cities, substantial progress has been and can be made at
those levels in the near-term. Allocation of D-Block bandwidth to these efforts
will accelerate their progress.").
255 See Dowd Interoperability Statement, supra note 251, at 4 ("Even if the
FCC's proposed public private partnership auction plan is successful-and there
is significant uncertainty on this point given the failure of the last auction to
generate even a single qualifying bid-it is unlikely that the commercial partner
would be prepared to provide services to public safety before 2012 at the
earliest.").
256 FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Andrle Statement, supra note 251, at 2
("As we and others have suggested in comments, the Commission should allow
local and regional public safety entities to construct their own mission-critical
broadband mobile systems on the Public Safety broadband spectrum, so long as
those systems meet or exceed the interoperability and other technical
requirements of the national network, or are capable of migrating to the
technology chosen by the D Block licensee."); see FCC En Banc Public
Hearing,supra note 193 (statement of Stacey Black, Chairman, Executive Dir.Market Dev., AT&T, Inc.) (agreeing with the notion that the spectrum should be
auctioned on a regional basis).
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given the use of the proper internet protocols and appropriately
geared equipment.2 57 The use of an end-to-end network model,
which is currently in design, would not only cure gaps in
interoperability currently experienced by responding agencies, but
it would also provide for the continued use of public safety
equipment without replacement.2 58
On the other hand, nationwide license advocates object to
regional licensing on grounds that some-or even many-regions
might go unsold at auction, resulting in checkerboard coverage.259
They confute claims that the aforementioned gaps of
interoperability can so deftly be smoothed over, arguing
alternatively that the technical integration of regional networks in
creating a fluid, interoperable network could take years to fix.260

FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Andrle Statement, supra note 251, at 2
("[I]nteroperability among local and regional networks can be achieved by the
remarkable inherent flexibility of [Internet Protocol]-based networks and, for the
air interface, by imbedded interoperability in the latest broadband wireless user
equipment, with software-defined characteristics and multi-mode capabilities.
There is no need to dictate a single air interface technology. As with
commercial wireless networks, interoperable 'roaming' can be achieved among
multiple air interface technologies (and frequencies) using the latest handset
technologies. The most important task is to work out the accessibility and
interoperability of applications and functions-above the RF level in the rest of
the network.").
258 FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Richard
Taylor, Senior Technologist, Tyco Electronics M/A-Com) ("The power of IP is
that it permits public safety to keep using their legacy equipment for
interoperable communications, while laying a path for broadband data, video
and more efficient voice.").
259
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third Further Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 T 60 (Sept.
25, 2008) (pointing to comments filed by the Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials (APCO), which highlight the potential for technical
problems arising from region-based auction disparity).
260
Id. (considering comments filed by the National Public Safety
Telecommunications Counsel (NPSTC)). But see FCC En Banc Public
Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Stacey Black, Chairman, Executive
Director-Market Development, AT&T, Inc.) (refuting the contention of
nationwide proponents that network integration and patchy coverage would pose
problems).
257
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b. A Nationwide License Model
While some more progressive public safety advocates consider
the regional licensing model, staunch public safety purists cling to
the nationwide licensing concept. 26 ' Although the Commission
maintains a slight tilt toward nationwide licensing,26 2 it continues to
stress the importance of a public-private partnership in achieving
the public safety goal of the deployment of a cost-effective,
spectrally efficient, flexible public safety network.263
Other
benefits of a nationwide license, according to the Commission,
include a much more straightforward coordination between the D
Block licensee, the PSBL, and the public safety agencies that
would use the network.2 " Public safety proponents second the
notion on financial grounds, remaining firm on the stance that a
nationwide license provides the most viable means for funding a
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 1
65
(citing comments filed by, inter alia, the Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials (APCO), the International Municipal Signal
Association (IMSA), and the National Association of Telecommunications
Officers and Advisors (NATOA), the Commission noted "the majority of public
safety agencies assert that a single, nationwide license is the best way to achieve
an interoperable network."). FCC En Banc Public Hearing-GurssStatement,
supra note 228, at 2 ("APCO strongly supports the formation of a national,
interoperable, broadband public safety communications network.").
262 Third Further Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
242.
The Commission's most recent NPRM states the Commission's intention to give
priority to a nationwide licensing scheme. A regional scheme is to be employed
only in the case that the nationwide reserve is not met. Id.
263 Id.
66 ("A single, nationwide license may provide opportunities for cost
savings through elimination of redundant equipment (e.g., mobile base station
deployments in the event of natural disasters), processes (billing, etc.) or staff
(e.g., public safety support), and greater economies of scale for network
equipment or handsets. These cost savings might enhance the ability of the D
Block licensee to rapidly build the public safety broadband network in rural,
expensive-to-serve, less populated areas. We therefore tentatively conclude that
the economies of scale that a commercial entity could achieve through a single,
nationwide license could promote the rapid deployment of an advanced
nationwide public safety broadband network.").
264 Id.
67 ("The coordination scheme envisioned for the D Block could be
particularly efficient if there were only one licensee required to coordinate and
negotiate with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and local public safety
agencies.").
261
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nationwide broadband network which would use the spectrum
efficiently. 265 While regional licensing may provide a more
feasible route to financial viability of regional partnershipswhich, in itself, constitutes a desirable outcome-advocates point
out that the regional approach would not touch on the goal of a
nationwide deployment to serve the entire public equally. 266
These advocates advise that a nationwide network would
ensure that all public safety agencies-regardless of their size,
location, expertise, or financial resources-would have the same
opportunities to take advantage of broadband communications.267
On the other hand, regional licensing would allow only a few
agencies with substantial resources and expertise to provide their
communications
state-of-the-art
with
first
responders
technologies.26 8 Moreover, a single technology standard employed
in a nationwide scheme would allow users to acquire commercially
available technologies at lower costs than currently used custom
equipment, and would cut down on redundant costs incurred by the
broadband
duplicative
overlapping,
of
construction
infrastructure.269
Mindful of the benefits of nationwide ideals, dissenting
wireless providers, nevertheless, argue that no commercial entity
will find a nationwide license commercially viable with
requirements on par with those proposed in the Commission's
Second Report and Order.270 Note that some commentators take
FCC En Bane Public Hearing-GurssStatement, supra note 228, at 2
(reminding of the importance of funding of the nationwide broadband
interoperable public-safety network and that its most likely path to being
accomplished, is through a network-sharing agreement between the PSBL and
the winner of the D Block license).
265

266

Id.

Id. at 3 (extolling the benefits of a nationwide licensing model).
Id. (forecasting the inequities to result from the Commission's adoption of
a regional licensing model, describing the outcome as "islands of robust, and
probably incompatible, public safety broadband networks, surrounded by vast
unserved areas.").
269 Id. (analyzing the cost benefits to both the government and the commercial
entity associated with a nationwide license).
270 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14,301 68 (Sept.
267
268
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neither side, seemingly indifferent about whether a regional
approach or a nationwide approach will prevail.2 n In spite of other
creative licensing proposals offered up for the Commission's
consideration,272 however, the Commission has chosen to move
ahead with the regional versus national approach-at least for the
moment.273

25, 2008) (citing comments filed by both AT&T and Verizon Wireless). The
Second Report and Order set out goals and benchmarks to be met by a
nationwide commercial licensee that many, including service providers,
considered to be wholly unrealistic. While endorsing regional licensing in
general, they note that for a nationwide build-out to ever take place, the
Commission would need to take away several of the expectations they set forth
before the March auction. Id.
271 Id.
62 ("TeleCommUnity, a national association of local governments,
and Charlotte, North Carolina, Houston, Texas, and Montgomery County,
Maryland (TeleCommUnity), contends [sic] that there are strong arguments for
allocating regional licenses, for the D Block, as well as the single, nationwide
license approach.").
2 72
Id. ("Coverage Co. and Space Data Corp. ask the Commission to adopt an
approach that assigns one license for urban or more populated areas and another
license for rural or less populated areas. Other entities, such as Google and
Qualcomm, do not appear to favor a single, nationwide license or a multiple
regional license approach. They are more concerned that the Commission
establishes a public safety broadband network that is interoperable as soon as
practicable.").
273 Id. 1 74 ("We tentatively conclude that it would not serve the public
interest to split the D Block into one license for a high-population density area
and a second license covering low-population density, rural areas, as Coverage
Co. and Space Data request. Coverage Co. and Space Data's proposals do not
specify the boundaries of the geographic areas that the two licenses would
cover, which could present uncertainties for potential bidders and lead to
disputes. In addition, there is a substantial question about the commercial
viability of these two-license approaches. Coverage Co. and Space Data do not
appear to argue, and the arguments they make do not demonstrate, that their
two-license proposals are more commercially viable than the regional approach
we propose. Also, the record does not indicate that commenters, other than
Coverage Co. and Space Data, support these specific two-license proposals.
Based on the record and the unique characteristics of this proceeding, such as
the important obligations of the public/private partnership licensees, the
Commission would need a stronger record, before deciding that it should adopt a
geographic area licensing scheme that is significantly different from the schemes
the Commission has employed in the past.").
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c. The Risks and Rewards ofLowering OperationalStandards
Although public-safety factions differ in their views on the
benefits of a regional licensing model as opposed to the original
national model and vice versa,274 most public-safety proponents
agree in their opposition275 to the other proposition set forth in
September: the reduction of system design and priority access
requirements for the commercial licensees.2 76 In this view, for
every bit of slack in loosening the requirements for the commercial
licensees, the Commission lowers the standard for the public safety
network, making the hypothetical network less robust and less
useful to first responders.277 Ultimately, this will drive users
completely away from the public safety network.278 While the
intention of creating a fully functional public-safety network
appears to meet policy goals, a network based on anything but the
FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Michael
Copps, Senior Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, at 1-2) ("I am concerned that
the public safety community is of many different minds-too many-when it
comes to approaching this great challenge. And I am concerned that too many
of the people involved in this entire process are spending too much time
jockeying for position and placing blame, with too little spent doing the hard
work of information gathering, analysis, reaching out, compromise, and
developing new ideas.").
275 See Dowd Interoperability Statement, supra note 251, at 4 ("Weakening of
the standards, priority or coverage requirements will only serve to drive Public
Safety away from the system altogether. Public Safety needs to maintain it's
more stringent requirements which cops and firefighters need and will expect.").
276 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 56 (Sept.
25, 2008) ("[W]e find that certain reductions or modifications of the
274

requirements in the existing rules . . . will significantly improve the commercial

viability of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership requirements in the existing
rules are consistent with the Commission's fundamental public safety objectives,
and will significantly improve the commercial viability of the 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership .... ).
277 See Dowd Interoperability Statement, supra
note 251, at 3-4.
278 Id.; see FCC En Banc Public Hearing,supra note
193 (statement of Paul
Cosgrave, Comm'r, City of New York, Dep't of Info. Tech. & Telecommc'ns)
("It is the City of New York's opinion that the nation's cities will not willingly
move their critical first responder wireless voice or data communications to a
nationwide network with 'degraded' security, reliability and redundancy
characteristics.").
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most rigid performance requirements and priority access loses its
purpose quickly as the standard drops.279
On the other hand, potential commercial bidders argue such
loosened rules would not necessarily preclude the build-out and
operation of an interoperable public safety network to the desired
specifications of the public safety contingent.2 80 Some proponents
of this view insist that even with modified requirements that favor
commercial viability, the Commission could achieve both its goals
of public safety and commercial viability through other means.
One such proposal suggests that the Commission could achieve
a high-standard public safety network through the use of targeted
bidding credits. 281
Under this proposal, the one or more
commercial licensees would be credited financially for meeting
extra public safety specifications above and beyond an agreedupon base standard of operation.282 Consequently, although the
high standards of public safety would not be imposed upon these
commercial licensees via the NSA, the commercial incentives
provided to the licensees would work to achieve the high standards

See Dowd Interoperability Statement, supra note 251, at 4 ("[The PSST
has] proposed reducing the system design and priority access requirements to
make the D Block spectrum more palatable to the commercial wireless industry.
Public safety can not allow that to happen. Weakening of the standards, priority
or coverage requirements will only serve to drive Public Safety away from the
system altogether. Public Safety needs to maintain it's [sic] more stringent
requirements which cops and firefighters need and will expect.").
280
FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Lawrence R.
Krevor, Vice President Governmental Affairs, Sprint Nextel Corp., at 2-3) ("In
revising its rules for the re-auction of the D Block, the Commission should use
targeted bidding credits to create the commercial incentives that will ensure the
construction of a nationwide, interoperable, broadband wireless network.. . . To
make the D Block commercially viable, and to promote widespread participation
in the auction, the Commission should adopt a series of targeted bidding credits
to encourage carriers to offer specific features or characteristics desired by
public safety users.").
279

281

id.

Id; see FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of
Leonard Fatica, Senior Dir. of Public Safety, Alcatel-Lucent) (supporting the
idea of a more attainable "baseline service" requirements as a nationwide
standard).
282
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in a more agreeable, less forceful way. 283 Nonetheless, public
safety advocates see these creative market arrangements as missing
the point and prone to risk, as such arrangements do not offer the
certainty offered by pre-set standards.284
C. The Commission Should Resist Reducing Standards While
Ensuringthat Licensing Will Occur as a Result of the
Upcoming Auction
The Commission's most recent proposal contains three notable
determinations that require comment. 285 First, the Commission's
proposed investigation into the possibility of reducing standards to
make an interoperable, broadband public safety network more
viable, 286 and thus more palatable, to commercial licensees ignores
the reason why the licenses are being auctioned.287 Second, while
FCC En Banc Public Hearing,supra note 193 (statement of Lawrence R.
Krevor, Vice President Governmental Affairs, Sprint Nextel Corporation, at 2-3)
("In revising its rules for the re-auction of the D Block, the Commission should
use targeted bidding credits to create the commercial incentives that will ensure
the construction of a nationwide, interoperable, broadband wireless network
283

....

To make the D Block commercially viable, and to promote widespread

participation in the auction, the Commission should adopt a series of targeted
bidding credits to encourage carriers to offer specific features or characteristics
desired by public safety users.").
284 Id. (statement of Stagg Newman, Principal, Pigsah Comm Consulting) ("I
submit that priority one is building the broadband wireless network capabilities
needed for first responders. The FCC should not be diverted from that focus by,
for example, the 'pipe dream' of creating a third wireless broadband alternative
to wireline DSL and cable, which would take well in excess of 100 MHz of
prime low frequency spectrum to be viable.").
285 See generally In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792
MHz Bands, Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
(Sept. 25, 2008).
2 6
Id. 1 56 ("[W]e find that certain reductions or modifications of the
requirements in the existing rules . . . will significantly improve the commercial

viability of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership requirements in the existing
rules are consistent with the Commission's fundamental public safety objectives,
and will significantly improve the commercial viability of the 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership .... ).
287 In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289 T 395 (July 31, 2007). In its
Second Report and Order, the Commission highlighted the goal of promoting
public safety through a fully functional, high-standard, interoperable public-
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the Commission's parallel auction suggestion is logically sound,
the Commission should reconsider its reasoning with respect to
what should trigger the failsafe mechanism of regional licensing.288
Lastly, in the event that neither a national auction nor a regional
auction succeeds, the Commission's willingness to permit a
situation in which no licenses would change hands2 " deserves
questioning.
1. The Commission Should Reject ProposalsReducing the System
Standards
While considering possible modifications to existing rules and
requirements to govern D Block usage, the Commission should not
allow per se reductions in the standards to which commercial
licensees will adhere. In its assessment, the Commission should
commit to trading time and costs for quality and reliability,
maintaining its original position that only a fully functional and
robust network-as determined by public safety-will suffice.
The Commission should act expeditiously but thoroughly in
attaining the level of expertise necessary to properly evaluate the
feasibility issues involved with the public safety vision.290 In doing
so, the Commission must weigh the functionality and utility of the
nationwide interoperable public-safety network against the speed
safety network as the driving force behind the concept of the public/private
partnership(s) into which the future licensee(s) will enter. Id.
288 See Third FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking,
23 F.C.C.R. 14,301
246. The Commission has planned to adopt regional licensing, essentially, in
the event that first nationwide licensing fails, and then regional licensing shows,
by an unconvincing standard, that it offers the promise of one day allowing
interoperable public-safety communications.
289 Id.
242 ("If the provisionally winning bids do not cover at least half of
the nation's population, the auction will be cancelled and no D Block licenses
will be awarded based on the results of the auction.").
290 FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Michael
Copps, Senior Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, at 2) ("Only after public
safety demonstrates what it really requires and explains who and what it brings
to the table. Only after the private sector has waded into what works and
doesn't and laid out a clear path that holds the probability of attracting a viable
commercial partner to build a viable public safety network. Only after the FCC
builds its expertise and exercises the leadership it must in order to shepherd this
through to success.").
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with which it is deployed. In other words, how much utility would
be gained by an extra three years in deployment time? How much
functionality would be lost by advancing the deployment deadline
by three years? Nevertheless, the Commission should avoid at all
costs the mindset that "something is better than nothing." 29 1
Taking the time and incurring the costs to build a fully
functional, interoperable public safety network will benefit the
public in ways that will be felt for decades to come. 92 Thus, while
delayed deployment and slower implementation of the network
might prompt doomsday predictions from some,293 the time and
effort invested in the network will reap rewards far beyond those
offered by a cheaper, quicker deployment.2 94
Of course, it is naive to believe that commercial viability for
any entity, no matter how financially equipped, is achievable with
public-safety standards that put off all otherwise interested parties.
Thus, in espousing the view that standards should not be loosened
at the expense of public safety, public safety agencies should
remain realistic with respect to their expectations of operating
protocols.
FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Andrle Statement, supra note 251, at 2
("The goal of establishing mission-critical mobile broadband wireless service,
however, should not be dependent on the commercial priorities of a D Block
licensee. The Commission and the public safety community must be careful to
resist a 'something is better than nothing' mentality if that something falls short
of this goal. To do otherwise defeats the whole purpose here.").
292 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. at 15,560 (statement of Comm'r
Copps) ("[The interoperable broadband public-safety network] will be
constructed to the standards that public safety demands and expects. And it will
harness the astonishing technological advances of the commercial wireless
sector. If it works-and that's a big if-the American people will be
appreciably safer.").
293 FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement of Harlin
McEwen, Chairman, Public Safety Spectrum Trust Corporation, at 2) ("What we
do not have is the luxury of time.").
294 Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. at 15,560 (statement of Comm'r
Copps) ("[The interoperable broadband public-safety network] will be
constructed to the standards that public safety demands and expects. And it will
harness the astonishing technological advances of the commercial wireless
sector. If it works-and that's a big if-the American people will be
appreciably safer.").
291
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The Commission has taken a wise first step by pushing the
deadline to build-out and deploy the network for operation from
ten to fifteen years. 295 Extending the deadline will attract more
bidders with more realistic construction milestones without
compromising the performance of the network. 296 And while it
should be lauded for its action, the Commission must continue to
push forward with rulemaking that both encourages the
deployment of a nationwide interoperable public-safety network
and reinforces the message that the operational standards of the
network will not be lowered if public safety is compromised by
doing so. Keeping public safety at the fore of its decisions
regarding the D Block, the Commission should resist proposed
modifications coming at the expense of public safety.297
2. The Commission Should Give the RegionalLicensing
Approach Priority
The Commission stated its intention to retain the national
licensing model as the priority model, with regional licensing
coming into play only if the nationwide license does not meet its
reserve. However, the Commission should base the licensing
scheme it adopts not on meeting the reserve for the national
license, 298 but instead on the regional approach showing-by
worthy margin-that it will benefit public safety more.
The Commission has proven that it is willing to adjust the
reserve price for the D Block by nearly halving the reserve in its
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792
MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301, 14464 (Sept.
25, 2008) (noting the fifteen-year construction requirement in proposed rule
27.14(m)).
296 Id.
150.
297 FCC En Banc Public Hearing, supra note 193 (statement
of Harlin
McEwen, Chairman, Public Safety Spectrum Trust Corporation, at 2) ("The
technical standards the PSST proposed in its last filing represented our best
thinking at that time, but we remain open to discussion about the right balance
of technical, operational and, yes, economic elements for public safety and for
commercial users.").
298 See Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301
246. The Commission plans to use the reserve price for the national license as a
test to determine whether or not to move on to a consideration of regional
licensing.
295
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most recent proposal299 and seeking comment on whether it should
be reduced further. " This shows that the D Block's reserve price
is an artificial construct, the raising or lowering of which dictates
the "success" or "failure" of a particular auction. Acknowledging
this fact as the extent of its own second-guessable discretion, the
Commission should not constrain its decision between regional and
national licensing to be based purely on a single, arbitrarily
established reserve price.
Instead, the Commission's first order of business after the
upcoming auction should be to determine whether a certain amount
of the country will obtain coverage through regional licensing. In
other words, the Commission should set pre-auction goals
outlining the desired amount of coverage by regional licensing. If
those goals are met, the Commission should give way to the
individual licensees to begin broadband deployment.
Using a more concrete and telling guideline in its assessment of
whether a regional or a national scheme should be adopted, the
Commission will not bind itself by adhering to such an arbitrary
reserve value, but it will instead assure itself that an educated and
coverage-based model will be adopted. Of course, one cannot
forget that the Commission's stated preference, as well as that of
much of the public safety world,30 ' is to award a nationwide license
to the D Block.302 Assuming, arguendo, that a nationwide license
is truly in the best interest of public safety, the proponents of the
regional licensing approach should bear the burden of proving that
it is a better option than a nationwide license. If a nationwide
Id. T 275 ("[W]e also tentatively conclude that it is in the public interest to
direct the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to establish initial minimum
opening bids for each set of alternative D Block licenses that equal or aggregate
approximately $750 million.").
300 Id. ("We seek comment on ...
whether the proposed aggregate [$750
million in] minimum opening bids should be lowered.").
301 FCC En Banc Public Hearing-GurssStatement, supra note 228, at 2-3
(noting the significant problems over recent years in trying to mend the gaps
between regional networks).
302 Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14,301
242
("[T]he high bid on the nationwide, technology platform alternative would be
the provisionally winning bid over any aggregate bid(s) covering less population
in the two sets of regional licenses . . . .").
299
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license is presumptively more beneficial to the interest of public
safety,303 shouldn't the regional scheme bear the burden of proving
its superiority to the nationwide scheme on the basis of public
safety?
Unfortunately, despite the presumptive superiority of the
nationwide license,3" the Commission cannot allow for a white
flag scenario30 5 in which regional licensing is adopted simply
because a highly questionable price tag goes unmet and a mere half
of the U.S. population is guaranteed the benefits of a public safety
network.0 Such a scenario demonstrates just the "something is
better than nothing" mentality the Commission should avoid. 3
Instead, the Commission should weigh the technological,
financial, and logistical benefits and shortcomings of both regional
and national approaches before establishing auction rules for the
next auction. Because attaining a working, financially feasible
nationwide license model has proven elusive,30 8 the Commission
should elevate the regional model to priority. In its establishment
Id.

Given that (1) the Commission continues to give priority to a
nationwide approach and (2) the interest seeking the most satisfaction through
the auction is public safety, the Commission could presume a nationwide
licensing model to be in the best interest of public safety. Id.
304 Id. ("[T]he high bid on the nationwide, technology platform alternative
would be the provisionally winning bid over any aggregate bid(s) covering less
303

population in the two sets of regional licenses . . . .").
305 Id. The Commission's proposal offers a bailout scenario in which regional
licensing is triggered only as a failsafe to mitigate poor participation in both
national and regional auctions. See id. 246 ("[W]e tentatively conclude, as an
initial matter, that we will not award any licenses unless the total population
covered by licenses with high bids meets or exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the
U.S. population.").
306 Id. 246 ("[W]e tentatively conclude, as an initial matter, that we will not
award any licenses unless the total population covered by licenses with high bids
meets or exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the U.S. population.").
307 FCC En Banc Public Hearing-Andrle Statement, supra note 251, at 2
("The goal of establishing mission-critical mobile broadband wireless service,
however, should not be dependent on the commercial priorities of a D Block
licensee. The Commission and the public safety community must be careful to
resist a 'something is better than nothing' mentality if that something falls short
of this goal. To do otherwise defeats the whole purpose here.").
308 See In re Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23
F.C.C.R. 4572 1 2 (Mar. 20, 2008).
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of rules for the upcoming auction, the Commission will have the
opportunity to set a coverage goal greater than the 50% regional
population coverage suggested in Commission's September
proposal. If the Commission can set financially productive
regional reserves without reducing system requirements-if the
regional approach is truly feasible from all angles, as its
proponents argue-it should prevail, and it should prevail more
convincingly than a nationwide winning bid that might exceed a
single moveable metric.
Further, the Commission should take a hard look at what it
hopes to retrieve monetarily in return for the D Block. While
expecting a considerable deposit to the U.S. Treasury may have
been reasonable at the time of the March 2008 auction, times have
Regardless of the D Block spectrum's desirable
changed.
characteristics and considerable commercial value, potential
bidders are far less likely now than they were in 2008 to spend
impressive amounts for the D Block with the specter of a suffering
economy looming. Because the costs associated with the build-out
of a public-private partnership-type network are quite substantial in
themselves,30 9 the Commission may want to consider awarding the
D Block at no cost to a commercial entity with the means to fund
such a built-out."o Notwithstanding any commitments"' already
made for the non-D Block revenue from the 700 MHz auction, the
Ryan Hallahan & Jon M. Peha, Quantifying the Costs of a Nationwide
Broadband Public Safety Wireless Network, PROCEEDINGS OF 36TH
309

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE (Carnegie

Mellon

Univ., Sept. 2008) (estimating the buildout to cost around $10 billion).
310 About Auctions, supra note 31. Prior to 1994, the Commission primarily
disposed of spectrum licenses through comparative hearings and lotteries.
Comparative hearings entailed the presentation of several applicants' cases to
the Commission after which the Commission would evaluate those cases and
ultimately decide which applicant would make best use of the spectrum. The
1994 adoption of the auction format was seen as a step in the direction of
efficiency and fairness. However, in light of the purpose-specific D Block
license, and the public's somewhat more weighted stake in the efficient usage of
that portion of the spectrum, comparative hearings might offer a better way to
maximize the usage of that spectrum quickly and efficiently. Id.
The proceeds from the 700 MHz
3" 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(E)(iii) (2006).
auction were to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury by June 30, 2008. Id.
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Commission might also consider using some of this revenue to
assist in a build-out.
3. The Commission Should Take Measures to Eliminate the
Possibility That the Auction Fails
The Commission's most recent position also mentions the
possibility of retaining all licenses subject to unsuccessful auctions
for both nationwide and regional licenses. 312 Such a measure not
only would impede maximization of the spectrum and broadband
deployment, but would suspend indefinitely any minimally
productive efforts to affect the improvement of public-safety
communications. While obtaining fair value for the spectrum
through auction requires proper planning and preparation, the
Commission should assure itself that a third auction will not be
necessary after the upcoming one.
In light of the Commission's current opportunity to reshape the
rules of the public/private partnership, further regulatory delays
following an unsatisfactory auction would offend the public
interest. The Commission should not allow itself to burn more
opportunities at getting the auction right. Although undesirable,
the delays in nationwide deployment cited by both regional and
national proponents in attacking the positions of one another would
work toward the ultimate interest of public safety. Since these
delays are most likely to occur during construction and
development of a public safety network, they ultimately would
further efforts to implement the system. Additional regulatory
delays, on the other hand, would accomplish very little. Such
delays result from lack of forethought, a lack that, especially at this
stage, cannot be afforded. The Commission's need for planning
and coordination through public safety and industry feedback is
not unappreciated. To rush an auction for the sole purpose of
timing would offend the public interest greatly. However, the
Commission must adopt at least soft rules and procedures to
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792
MHz Bands,
Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14,301 242 (Sept.
25, 2008) ("If the provisionally winning bids do not cover at least half of the
nation's population, the auction will be cancelled and no D Block licenses will
be awarded based on the results of the auction.").
312
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guarantee itself, and more importantly the public, that the
spectrum's development and usage come about sooner rather than
later.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the implementation of an interoperable broadband publicsafety network, the Commission should resist its own urges, as
well those made by commercial entities, to placate interests other
than public safety. While promoting commercial broadband
deployment and competition and obtaining maximum value for the
700 MHz spectrum are in the public's interest, these objectives doe
not necessarily serve the public's best interest. Because the public
will be better served by investments made in a network to provide
first responders with the tools they need to respond quickly and
accordingly to life-threatening national and regional calamities, the
Commission should resist lowering standards and loosening
requirements it had originally envisioned for the interoperable
public safety network. Further, while the Commission's current
logic on parallel auctions is sound, its assertion that regional
licenses should be adopted as a failsafe for an unmet nationwide
license reserve price is flawed. The Commission should give
priority to a regional licensing model in the upcoming auction.
Moreover, the Commission should avoid any possibility of an
unsuccessful auction by putting in place safeguards that will work
to facilitate the licensing no matter what.

